This research is conducted under the premise that it is quite common the ownership of the contemporary enterprise is separated from the right to operate; therefore under the circumstances that the owner and the operator are not the same person status will be researched as result. There are four major conclusions of this research. First, when both principals decide to jointly cooperate with each other, the marginal reward offered to the agent by principal should be equivalent to the marginal income for the principal; then, both principals can reach the goal of maximizing their joint profits. Secondly, when elasticity of demand in the market is big, the agent's reward offered from the principals is positively correlated with agent's output; when elasticity of demand in the market is small, the agent's reward offered from the principals is negatively correlated with agent's output; when elasticity of demand in the market is equal to 1, the higher principals give the agent reward will lead to decrease profits of the principals. Thirdly, as the principals holding shares with the cost of capital to be taken into account, when the profit is greater than the cost of capital, each of the two principals holds half of the shares assuming they make decisions with the same time, or, the principals will form a single case with a number of agents assuming they are not making decisions at the same time. Conversely, when the profit is less than the cost of capital, the two principals will not hold shares. Lastly, if the interest rate is the function of shares and interest rate function first-order differential is equal to 0, the result is the same with the economic content of the cost of capital to be taken into account.