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題名：董監事暨重要職員責任保險與彌補虧損減資宣告效應
作者：吳耀宗
作者(外文)：Wu, Yao Tsung
校院名稱：國立高雄科技大學
系所名稱：財務金融學院博士班
指導教授：蘇玄啟
學位類別：博士
出版日期：2023
主題關鍵詞：董監事暨重要職員責任保險；彌補虧損減資；公司治理；道德風險；代理問題；Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance；Capital Reduction to Cover Accumulated Deficits；Corporate Governance；Moral Hazard；Agency Problem
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本文採用2009年至2021年間從事彌補虧損減資宣告的台灣上市(櫃)公司為研究樣本，探討董監事暨重要職員責任保險(簡稱董監事責任保險)如何影響彌補虧損減資宣告的股東財富效果。本文實證結果穩健地顯示董監事責任保險與彌補虧損減資宣告期間報酬率呈現顯著負向關係；此結果支持「道德風險攸關的代理問題假說」：董監事責任保險轉移管理階層潛在訴訟風險而誘發攸關盈餘操弄的代理衝突問題，致使市場投資人傾向解讀該公司彌補虧損減資決策僅是滿足管理階層私利的盈餘操弄掩飾工具，因而在彌補虧損減資宣告期間給予更為負面評價。本文進一步實證結果指出，董監事責任保險與彌補虧損減資宣告期間報酬率的負向關係更顯見於高度資訊不對稱的樣本公司；然而此負向關係在具有高度外部監督機制的樣本公司則不復存在。有趣的是，本文實證亦發現，在2018年8月1日公司法172條增列「減資不得以臨時動議提出」之後的樣本期間，董監事責任保險對於彌補虧損減資宣告期間股東財富的負向解釋力已不復存在；此結果隱含法規增修確實強化公司治理機制，以抑制董監事責任保險所誘發的代理問題。本文為首篇探討董監事責任保險與彌補虧損減資決策價值之實證關係，以補充董監事責任保險、公司減資決策與公司治理等相關文獻之不足。
Using a sample of announcements of capital reduction to cover accumulated deficits (CRCAD) made by the TWSE- and TPEx-listed firms during 2009−2021, this study examines how directors’ and officers’ liability insurance (D&O insurance) influences shareholder wealth during the period of CRCAD announcements. Our robust evidence shows that D&O insurance coverage is significantly negatively associated with CRCAD announcement-period abnormal returns. The evidence is supported by the moral hazard-related agency problem hypothesis, asserting that D&O insurance coverage limits managerial exposure to potential litigation risk and, thus, induces managerial agency conflicts related to earnings manipulation. Hence, stock market investors are likely to respond unfavorably toward the announcements of CRCAD that encourages the pursuit of managerial self-interest private benefit. Our further evidence shows that the negative relation between D&O insurance coverage and CRCAD announcement-period abnormal return is more pronounced for firms with greater information asymmetry, while is more mitigated for firms with greater external monitoring. Interestingly, we also show that the negative effect of D&O insurance coverage on CRCAD announcement-period abnormal return becomes insignificant after August 1, 2018 when the Article 172 of Company Act is amended “capital reduction decision shall not be brought up as extemporary motions”. This implies that the amendment to Company Act strengthens corporate governance mechanism in mitigating D&O insurance coverage-driven managerial agency conflict. This study is the first to examine the relation between D&O insurance coverage and the valuations of CRCAD, thus enriching the literature on D&O insurance, CRCAD, and corporate governance.
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