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題名：政府訂約要求與業者不再承諾續擴的公私部門夥伴關係(PPPs)－以ETC建置歷程為例
作者：陳柏宏
作者(外文)：CHEN, BO-HONG
校院名稱：元智大學
系所名稱：管理學院博士班
指導教授：劉恒逸
學位類別：博士
出版日期：2023
主題關鍵詞：臺灣高速公路電子收費系統；公私部門夥伴關係；不再承諾續擴；權益；Taiwan Highway Electronic Toll Collection System；public-private partnerships (PPPs)；de-escalation of commitment；rights and interests
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公私部門的合作夥伴關係(PPPs)，已成為近年來組織管理領域中，不可忽視的研究趨勢，然而在一個資訊相對透明且相對民主的國家中，PPPs契約的設計、公私部門的互動關係、以及關注公私部門背後的利害關係者之權益，已成為現今無法忽視的重要議題。以本研究而言，臺灣的BOT案子，業者追求私部門利益極大化的行為，原本就是無可厚非的，而且當業者與政府的利益目標不一致也不是問題，但是當業者無法達到政府原始的訂約要求時，表示民眾權益的極大化無法被滿足，此時業者與政府利益目標不一致的情況，將受到挑戰。對此，本研究認為，在一個資訊相對透明且相對民主的國家中，一個BOT的案子，業者必須先滿足政府契約的要求，也就是先滿足民眾權益的極大化，之後才有可能創造出私部門龐大的利益。本研究主要是探討遠通電收股份有限公司（以下稱遠通）承接臺灣政府ETC系統的建置歷程與公私部門夥伴關係的變化。本研究採用個案研究法，深度訪談遠通的高階主管和交通部高速公路局的副局長，並依循紮根理論的研究程序，進行訪談內容分析和理論建構。本研究主要結論如下：(1)政府當初的訂約要求，是希望遠通達到民眾權益極大化的目標，因此當遠通在初始階段失敗時，政府也不會輕易地做出放寬標準的決定；(2)政府和遠通的公私部門夥伴關係，從一開始雙方關係逐漸劣化，到遠通採取上訴的行動，使得雙方關係變成更惡化，產生嚴重的衝突對峙，然而，雙方的關係並沒有因此破裂，反而在政府協助遠通的這個契機下，使得雙方能夠重新摸索找到契合的可能，此時公私部門開始翻轉成合作關係，並且在雙方達到契合與共識後，兩者成為了緊密的夥伴關係，雙方一起合作把ETC做好；(3)由於政府和遠通在公私部門夥伴關係之中，彼此之間的共識都是要把ETC做好，因此當遠通在初始階段失敗並決定採取替代方案的行動時，政府就從監督者的角色轉變成協助者的角色，共同協助遠通把ETC做好，並且達成高速公路全面電子計程收費的政策目標；(4)政府和遠通在BOT的公私部門關係之中，以交易為基礎的契約固然重要，然而同樣是重要利害關係人之一的民眾在其中也扮演著影響力十足的重要角色，因此私部門組織對於民眾這位重要利害關係人之一的重視程度，將會影響到公私部門之間的關係；(5)一個資訊相對透明且相對民主的國家中，一個BOT的案子，私部門組織必須同時考量到民眾和股東的權益，這才是讓一個BOT案子，能夠成功的關鍵因素之一。最後，本文研究發現，分別針對政府的訂約要求、遠通不再承諾續擴的行動、以及政府和遠通的公私部門夥伴關係的變化等三方面進行探討，以此提出本文的觀點與建議供學界與產業界參考。
關鍵詞：臺灣高速公路電子收費系統、公私部門夥伴關係、不再承諾續擴、權益。
Public–private partnerships (PPPs) have become a prominent research topic in the study of organizational management in recent years. Moreover, in a transparent and democratic country, the design of PPP contracts, interactions between the public and private sectors, and concerns regarding stakeholders’ rights and interests in terms of PPPs have become important issues that cannot be overlooked. From the perspective of this study, a private sector company’s pursuit of maximized interests in a build–operate–transfer (BOT) project may naturally be considered justifiable and reasonable even if the company’s targets of interests are not aligned with that of the government; however, if the company fails to fulfill the government’s original contractual demands, public interest cannot be maximized and the inconsistency of interests between the company and government would face challenges. Thus, this study argues that in a transparent and democratic country, companies involved in BOT projects must first fulfill the government’s contractual demands, namely, satisfying the public’s maximized interests, before creating massive profits for the private sector. This study discusses the construction process of the electronic toll collection system project undertaken by Far Eastern Electronic Toll Collection Company Limited (FETC) with the Taiwanese government and changes in their PPP. The case study method was adopted, and in-depth interviews were conducted with senior executives of the FETC and the deputy director of the Freeway Bureau, Ministry of Transportation and Communications. Thereafter, the interview content was analyzed and theories were constructed following a research procedure as per grounded theory. The main findings of this study are as follows: (1) The requirements of the original contract with the government were for the FETC to maximize public interests; therefore, when the FETC failed in the primary stage, the government did not simply lower the contractual demands. (2) The PPP between the government and FETC had been deteriorating gradually since the beginning, and the appeal action by FETC resulted in a more serious conflict and confrontation between both parties. However, the partnership did not end; rather, with the government’s assistance to FETC, the two parties explored the possibility of finding a new fit. At this point, the relationship between the public and private sectors evolved into a cooperative one, and both parties formed a close partnership to collaboratively complete the ETC system project after reaching a consensus and agreement. (3) In the PPP, the government and FETC reached a consensus to do a good job of completing the ETC project. Thus, when FETC failed in the initial stage and decided to pursue an alternative plan, the government changed its role from being a supervisor to a facilitator, assisting FETC in completing the ETC system while achieving the policy goal of complete ETC coverage on the highway. (4) Admittedly, the transaction-based contract was the most important in the PPP between the government and FETC under a build-operate-transfer project; however, the people, who are also important stakeholders, played an influential and critical role therein. Therefore, the significance that private sector organizations placed on the public would likely affect the public–private relationship. (5) In a transparent and democratic country, private sector companies undertaking a BOT project must account for the rights and interests of the public and shareholders, which is crucial for the success of a BOT project. Finally, the present study addresses three issues: government’s contractual demands, FETC’s move to de-escalate commitment, and changes in the PPP between the government and FETC. Based on the findings, this study proposes viewpoints and recommendations as a reference for academia and the industry.
Keywords: Taiwan Highway Electronic Toll Collection System; public-private partnerships (PPPs); de-escalation of commitment; rights and interests
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