臺灣人文及社會科學引文索引資料庫系統

:::

詳目顯示

回上一頁
第 1 筆 / 總合 1 筆   第一頁 上一頁 下一頁 最後一頁
/1頁
題名：高階主管與基層員工的薪酬對於公司績效的影響：競賽理論或是公平理論？
作者：黃建豐
作者(外文)：Haung, Chien-Feng
校院名稱：國立嘉義大學
系所名稱：企業管理學系
指導教授：李鴻文
蔡進發
學位類別：博士
出版日期：2023
主題關鍵詞：薪資差異倍數；競賽理論；公平理論；生產效率；公司價值；Pay gap；tournament theory；equity theory；production efficiency；firm valuation
原始連結：連回原系統網址new window
相關次數：
  • 被引用次數被引用次數:期刊(0) 博士論文(0) 專書(0) 專書論文(0)
  • 排除自我引用排除自我引用:0
  • 共同引用共同引用:0
  • 點閱點閱:0
近年來，討論高階主管與基層員工薪酬的議題受到學術界、社會與媒體很大的關注。『競賽理論』認為，大的高階主管薪酬與基層員工薪資差異倍數，可以提供基層員工誘因努力工作，可以增加公司的生產效率以及提高公司價值。另外一方面，『公平理論』認為，過大的高階主管與基層員工薪資差異倍數，會造成基層員工被不公平對待的感覺，影響了工作士氣，對於提高公司的生產效率以及提高公司價值的目標是不利的。本論文以台灣的上市櫃公司在2012年至2020年期間為研究樣本，探討高階主管與基層員工薪資差異倍數對於公司績效(包括生產效率與公司價值)的影響，研究樣本共有13,368筆觀察直。研究資料顯示，薪酬倍數平均數是11.09倍，薪酬倍數平均數近來有降低的趨勢，可能受到整體社會反抗大企業的貪婪不公和社會不平等的氛圍的影響。電子業的薪酬倍數平均數遠高於非電子業，且電子業的薪酬倍數有右偏的現象，平均數受到極端值的影響。
此外，本論文發現，低的機構投資人持股、高的研究支出比率、高的股票波動性，會導致於高的薪資差異倍數，意味著具有這些特性的股票由於較難監督，因此會透過提高高階主管與基層員工薪資差異倍數來進行激勵，作為監督的替代機制，此發現符合了『競賽理論』。最後，本論文的實證結果顯示，過大的高階主管與基層員工薪資差異倍數，不利於生產效率與公司價值，此點發現支持了『公平理論』。
The topic related to the gap between top executive compensation and employee salary has attracted the interests from academics, society, and media. On one hand, the tournament theory posits that large pay gap can induce employees work hard, leading to better production efficiency and higher firm valuation. On the other hand, the equity theory argues that larger pay gap may impose unfair treatment for employees, causing worse production efficiency and lower firm valuation. This dissertation uses public firms in Taiwan stock market from 2012 to 2020 as a sample (13,368 observations) to investigate the influences of pay gap on firm performance, including production efficiency and firm valuation. The empirical evidences show that the average pay gap between top executive compensation and employee salary is 11.09 times in sample period. Interestingly, the average pay gap gradually decreases over time, showing that the public firms in Taiwan has a positive response to the social movement calling for justice and fairness. Moreover, the electronic firms have significant higher pay gap than general industrial firms. The distribution of pay gap in electronic firms is right skewed, indicating that such pay gap has some extreme positive outliers.
Furthermore, the empirical results show that firms with low institutional ownership, higher R&D expenditures, and higher stock return volatility, tend to have higher pay gap. Since low institutional ownership, high R&D expenditures, and high return volatility are features that characterize the difficulties of monitoring, the finding suggests that the high pay gap is a substitute of monitoring, which is consistent with the prediction of tournament theory. Finally, the empirical results demonstrate that larger pay gap will result in poorer production efficiency and lower market valuation, which is consistent the prediction of equity theory.
陳明園、石雅慧(2004)。高階經理人薪酬-代理理論與競賽理論之實證研究，台大管理論叢，15(1)，131-166頁。
李佳玲(2006)。不確定性、高階經理人報償差距與公司績效之關聯性：競賽理論之驗證，會計評論，42，23-53。
熊欣華、胡宛仙、李佳如(2019)。團隊安全氣候、員工安全行為與安全後果之關聯：社會影響理論觀點。人力資源管理學報，19(1)，119-144。
汪進揚、林慧茹(2021)。薪酬公平性：員工生產力與控制權偏離之影響。管理學報，38(2)，203-23頁。
Adams, J. S. (1965). Inequity in social exchange. In Advances in experimental social psychology. Academic Press, 2, 267-299
Albuquerque, R., Koskinen, Y., & Zhang, C. (2019). Corporate social responsibility and firm risk: Theory and empirical evidence. Management Science, 65(10), 4451-4469.
Bannister, J. W., Newman, H. A., & Peng, E. Y. (2020). Top management tournament incentives and credit ratings. Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 55, 769-801.
Bardos, K. S., Ertugrul, M., & Gao, L. S. (2020). Corporate social responsibility, product market perception, and firm value. Journal of Corporate Finance, 62, 101588.
Bebchuk, L. A., Cremers, K. M., & Peyer, U. C. (2011). The CEO pay slice. Journal of financial Economics, 102(1), 199-221.
Ben-Nasr, H., & Ghouma, H. (2018). Employee welfare and stock price crash risk. Journal of Corporate Finance, 48, 700-725.
Bristy, H. J., Han, J., & Tian, G. G. (2022). CEO power and labor-friendly policy. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 71, 101699.
Burns, N., Minnick, K., & Starks, L. (2017). CEO tournaments: A cross-country analysis of causes, cultural influences, and consequences. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 52(2), 519-551.
Chen, Z., Huang, Y., & Wei, K. J. (2013). Executive pay disparity and the cost of equity capital. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 48(3), 849-885.
Cheng, X., Palmon, D., Yang, Y., & Yin, C. (2021). Impact of tournament incentives on management earnings forecasts. Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance, 0148558X211055883.
Chowdhury, H., Hodgson, A., & Hasan, M. M. (2022). Does a competitive external labour market affect corporate social responsibility? Evidence from industry tournament incentives. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, 33, 100617.
Core, J. E., Holthausen, R. W., & Larcker, D. F. (1999). Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance. Journal of financial economics, 51(3), 371-406.
Correa, R., & Lel, U. (2016). Say on pay laws, executive compensation, pay slice, and firm valuation around the world. Journal of Financial Economics, 122(3), 500-520.
Cowherd, D. M., & Levine, D. I. (1992). Product quality and pay equity between lower-level employees and top management: An investigation of distributive justice theory. Administrative Science Quarterly, 302-320.
Dai, Y., Kong, D., & Xu, J. (2017). Does fairness breed efficiency? Pay gap and firm productivity in China. International Review of Economics & Finance, 48, 406-422.
Eriksson, T. (1999). Executive compensation and tournament theory: Empirical tests on Danish data. Journal of labor Economics, 17(2), 262-280.
Faleye, O., Reis, E., & Venkateswaran, A. (2013). The determinants and effects of CEO–employee pay ratios. Journal of Banking & Finance, 37(8), 3258-3272.
Faleye, O., & Trahan, E. A. (2011). Labor-friendly corporate practices: Is what is good for employees good for shareholders?. Journal of Business Ethics, 101, 1-27.
Freeman, R. E. (1984). Strategic management: a stakeholder approach (Pitman. Boston, MA).
Friedman, M. (1970). A Friedman doctrine: The social responsibility of business is to increase its profits. The New York Times Magazine, 13(1970), 32-33.
Gao, Z., & Rees, W. (2020). Do employee-friendly firms invest more efficiently? Evidence from labor investment efficiency. Journal of Corporate Finance, 65, No. 101744.
Jensen, M. C. (1986). Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers. The American economic review, 76(2), 323-329.
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of financial economics, 3(4), 305-360.
Kale, J. R., Reis, E., & Venkateswaran, A. (2009). Rank‐order tournaments and incentive alignment: The effect on firm performance. The Journal of Finance, 64(3), 1479-1512.
Kelly, P. J. (2014). Information efficiency and firm-specific return variation. The Quarterly Journal of Finance, 4(04), 1450018.
Khan, M. K., Ali, S., Zahid, R. M., Huo, C., & Nazir, M. S. (2022). Does whipping tournament incentives spur CSR performance? An empirical evidence from Chinese sub-national institutional contingencies. Frontiers in psychology, 13, 372.
Kini, O., & Williams, R. (2012). Tournament incentives, firm risk, and corporate policies. Journal of Financial Economics, 103(2), 350-376.
Lazear, E. P. (1989). Pay equality and industrial politics. Journal of political economy, 97(3), 561-580.
Lazear, E. P., & Rosen, S. (1981). Rank-order tournaments as optimum labor contracts. Journal of political Economy, 89(5), 841-864.
Lee, C. L., Lin, Y. G., & Chuang, Y. H. (2007). Performance consequences of pay dispersion within top management teams: The impact of firm collaboration needs. 會計評論, 45, 121-149.
Lee, D. W., & Liu, M. H. (2011). Does more information in stock price lead to greater or smaller idiosyncratic return volatility? Journal of Banking & Finance, 35(6), 1563-1580.
Lee, J., & Kim, H. (2016). Do employee relation responsibility and culture matter for firm value? International evidence. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 40, 191-209.
Lee, K. W., Lev, B., & Yeo, G. H. H. (2008). Executive pay dispersion, corporate governance, and firm performance. Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 30, 315-338.
Li, Z., Daspit, J. J., & Marler, L. E. (2022). Executive pay dispersion: Reconciling the differing effects of pay inequality and pay inequity on firm performance. The International Journal of Human Resource Management, 33(15), 3056-3084.
Liu, H., Luo, J. H., & Wang, X. (2021). Do controlling shareholders expropriate employees? Evidence from workplace fatalities in China. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 69, 101654.
Main, B. G., O'Reilly III, C. A., & Wade, J. (1993). Top executive pay: Tournament or teamwork ?. Journal of labor economics, 11(4), 606-628.
Rouen, E. (2020). Rethinking measurement of pay disparity and its relation to firm performance. The Accounting Review, 95(1), 343-378.
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). (2015). Pay ratio disclosure, Release Nos. 33-9877；34-75610. Washington, DC: SEC.
Shen, C. H. H., & Zhang, H. (2018). Tournament incentives and firm innovation. Review of Finance, 22(4), 1515-1548.
Siegel, P. A., & Hambrick, D. C. (2005). Pay disparities within top management groups: Evidence of harmful effects on performance of high-technology firms. Organization Science, 16(3), 259-274.
Xu, M., Kong, G., & Kong, D. (2017). Does wage justice hamper creativity? Pay gap and firm innovation in China. China Economic Review, 44, 186-202.
Ye, M., Li, M., & Zeng, Q. (2022). Former CEO director and executive-employee pay gap. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 76, 101863.
Zhao, X. (Rachel), Zhou, G. (Stephen), & Rezaee, Z. (2023). Tournament Incentives and Corporate Social Responsibility Performance. Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance, forthcoming.
 
 
 
 
第一頁 上一頁 下一頁 最後一頁 top
QR Code
QRCODE

臺灣人文及社會科學引文索引資料庫

目前上線人數：532（臺灣：525，外國：7） ／ 本年度總使用人次：2393369 ／ 訪客人次（自102年09月）：68201754
國家圖書館著作權聲明 Copyright © 2013 All rights reserved.
本館地址: 100201臺北市中山南路20號． 本館地圖及交通資訊．
總機：(02)23619132．最佳瀏覽解析度為1024x768以上