At the beginning of the twentieth century, G.E. Moore claimed that there is no relation between "what we ought to do" and "what we do do". To conflate the two is to commit the naturalistic fallacy. A century passed by, with the advancement of biology, genetic technology and HGP, the biologist-philosophers are allured to transgress is/ought boundary. They question the legitimacy of is/ought boundary, and problematize following issues, namely, should ethics takes what happen in our genes seriously? Is biology(natural selection, evolution) relevant to our moral reasoning? Morevoer, if cognition is made possible by a priori conditions, in analogy, does moral reasoning also has its a priori conditions? In other words, does the way people actually make moral judgments pre-conditions what good moral judgments are? This paper is about transgression. There are three alternatives all based on the natural history of morality, and they all reject rules-following, base of cognition, morality as well. The three alternatives I discuss in this paper are: ([]Reductive Naturalized Ethics represented by E. Wilson, R. Dakwins and R. Alexander, (2) Non-reductive Naturalized Ethics (Emergent Ethics) represented by H. Rolston; and (3) Postmodern emergent Ethics represented by P.Churchland, 0. Flanagan and P. Bourdieu. In order to discuss the characteristics of each alternative, and to compare their relative theoretical advantage and disadvantage with each other, I focus my discussion on the genesis of altruistic behavior(generosity in particular) , with the