本文的目的在於闡述胡塞爾「人的態度」 之概念，將以說明他的人文社會科學理論觀點。「人的態度」相對於「自然主義態度」兩者分別是人文社會科學反自然科學構成的基礎。胡塞爾的主張是，人文社會現象領域所特有的意義與價值若用自然科學去加以探討將穩而不顯，基於「人的態度」之人文社會科學才是適當的取徑。 胡塞爾並且認為，各種態度與其構成對象還有各種態度彼此間的關係唯有透過他的超驗現象學才能獲得釐清，本文對於這點頗能認同。胡塞爾人文社會科學理論的缺失在於「人的態度」此概念本身所具有的歧異性，它一方面指涉科學態度，但另一方面也指涉日常生活態度。既然胡塞爾對兩者未能加以區分，則人文社會科學的科學性也因此未能得到適切的定位。

　　　　　An inquiry into the notion of "personalistic attitude" in Husserl is attempted. The personalistic attitude and the naturalistic attitude constitute the human-social science and the natural science respectively. According to Husserl, the former is appropriate to explore the values and meanings in the human-social world, whereas the latter in contrast would result in the naturalization of the human-social phenomena, that is, concealing their significance. Husserl contends moreover that his transcendental phenomenology alone is capable of clarifying the correlative relation between attitudes and their constitutions as well as the distinction between attitudes. I hold this to be Husserl's contribution to the theory of human-social science in general, yet I find that Husserl fails to distinguish the daily lifeworld attitude and scientific attitude, because both are involved in the notion of personalistic attitude. Such an ambiguity is held to be a defect in Husserl's theory of human-social science in this paper.