本文旨在探討現象學心理學在胡塞爾思想中所扮演的角色。對胡塞爾思想的理解一般都是以超驗現象學作為主軸來進行，所謂的現象學心理學要不是被忽略就是被放在超驗現象學的相關脈絡去看。本文一方面探討胡塞爾現象學心理學的意涵，說明還原概念在現象學心理學所具有的意義如何不同於超驗現象學，另一方面則藉由闡述《觀念》第二冊的「人的態度」來說明現象學心理學在胡塞爾思想中該如何被適當地定位。

The paper explores the role of phenomenological psychology in Edmund Husserl's method. Generally speaking, the phenomenological psychology is more or less neglected due to the impression that Husserl is mainly concerned with transcendental phenomenology. The investigation concentrates, on the one hand, the significance of phenomenological psychology in Husserl, explaining the different meanings of reduction in phenomenological psychology as well as in transcendental phenomenology. On the other hand, with the idea of “personalisitc attitude” in Ideen Ⅱ, the paper endeavors to fix the position of phenomenological psychology in Husserl's thought.