海德格質疑西方傳統形上學遺忘了作為存有「遮蔽面」的「無」，同樣的「無」的問題也一直困擾黑格爾，「有」與「無」的弔詭更是貫穿他的辯證法的核心概念。有別於西方「實體學」的傳統，「存有」的意義在黑格爾體系發生了逆轉，在《邏輯學》中〈必須用什麼作科學的開端？〉一文，黑格爾論及哲學的「開端」（der Anfang）時，提出了「純虛無」（das reine Nichts）的概念作為「存有」的第二性格，並論述「純存有與純虛無同一」的觀點。他反覆的使用「純粹」 （rein）這個概念來彰顯「純存有」在開始階段的「虛無性」，以突顯「無」在存有矛盾辯證過程的重要角色。本文扣緊黑格爾所論述「純有」（reines Sein）、「純無」（reines Nichts）、「缺如」（Mangel）、「第三者」（das Dritte）、「變」（Werden）等概念，希望揭示黑格爾如何立基於西方Logos的傳統來探討「無」的存有學意義。他扣緊Logos的傳統，闡釋理性活動是以揚棄知性為基礎，企圖建立一套融合「有無」、「正負」矛盾辯證的「統一哲學」。

Heidegger blames traditional Western metaphysics of forgetting the “nothingness” that “covers” begin. The same nation expressed as “not-being” also created difficulty in Hegel’s dialectics. The paradox of being and not-being plays an important role in his dialectics. The traditional way of conceiving being as substance has a reverse turn in Hegel’s Science of Logic. He asks himself in the chapter entitled” whereshould scientific reflection beings? and he uses the idea of. “pure not-being” to be the second moment of being. At the same time, he upholds the theory that “ being and not-being are one.” He repeatedly uses the expression of “pure” to show that “pure being” begins with “not-being.” In this ay, he makes clear the role that “not-being” plays in the dialectical novement of the mind. The intention of this paper is to investigate Hehel’s idea of “pure being,” “pure not-being,” “the their” and “becoming.” It attempts to show that the onological status of Hegel’s “not-being” is based on the traditional idea of “Logos” in Western philosophy. His uses logic to expose the nature of the activity og the spirit. He bypasses the rational elements of knowledge and intends to build up in this way a “Unified Philosophy” where being and not-being, positive and negative, meet and disappear into each other.