多員多工代理觀點下獎酬制度及績效衡量指標之設計__臺灣人文及社會科學引文索引資料庫

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題名：	多員多工代理觀點下獎酬制度及績效衡量指標之設計
書刊名：	高雄應用科技大學學報
作者：	高蘭芬／李文智
作者(外文)：	Kao, Lanfeng／Lee, Wenchih
出版日期：	2001
卷期：	31
頁次：	頁287-302
主題關鍵詞：	代理理論；獎酬制度；績效指標；多員代理；多工代理；Agency theory；Compensation scheme；Performance measure；Multi-agent；Multi-task
原始連結：	連回原系統網址
相關次數：	被引用次數:期刊(0) 博士論文(0) 專書(0) 專書論文(0) 排除自我引用:0 共同引用:0 點閱:21

雇主並不能直接觀察到員工的努力程度或決策行動，最好的獎酬制度與績效評估是找到一個或多個可觀察的變量來構成員工努力的客觀衡量，並根據這個或這些客觀衡量來支付員工薪資。在多位員工的模型下，員工的努力程度可以透過其他員工的績效表現出來，而本文則更以多位員工及多項工作的情況來描述代理問題。員工的努力不僅可以有其他員工的績效來顯現，也可以由其他工作的成績來反應。透過多位員工及多項工作的分析可以更加健全獎酬制度與績效衡量指標的設計。

以文找文

Since the principal cannot observe the effect or the actions taken by the agents, the compensation for the agents should be based on the observable factors. The agent’s effort can be revealed by other agents’ output under his multi-agent model. In this paper, we argue that not only the multi-agent model but also the multi-task model can reveal the agents’ effort. With the multi-agent and multi-task models, the compensation scheme can function more effectively.

以文找文

期刊論文
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學位論文
1.	楊榮鍾(1996)。以代理理論探討股份有限公司獎酬制度(碩士論文)。銘傳管理學院。延伸查詢
2.	張俊仁(1998)。效率工資理論的三個議題(博士論文)。國立中興大學。延伸查詢
3.	郭常銘(1996)。業務員報酬制度的研究(博士論文)。淡江大學。延伸查詢
4.	吳俊(1993)。以代理理論探討分權化組織獎酬制度之研究(碩士論文)。國立政治大學。延伸查詢

圖書
1.	Primer, A.(1998)。The economics of contracts。The MIT Press。

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