本研究考量一雙占市場，業者生產二種完全互補的產品，決定下列三種行銷組合定價策略之一：個別訂價、單純組合訂價以及混合組合訂價，之後筆者進行Bertrand同時競價。我們發現：有效率的聯合生產得以降低服務價格，使利潤增 加;當服務品質差異小時，將引發業者更激烈的價格競爭，使利潤減少；在此兩種競爭型態下，業者深怕採混合組合定價會引發更激烈之價格競爭造成利差減少，最後的均衡將採個別取價策略，然也造成業者追求利潤極大與社會福利極大相衝突。

We consider a duopolistic market each firm producing two perfectly complementary services. Each firm may employ one of the three bundling pricing strategies and we consider two price competition: Bertrand and Stackelberg. We obtain the following results: A more efficient joint production will allow the carrier to charge a lower price for its services and increase its profit. When the differentiation decreases, the price competition between carriers becomes more aggressive and hence, their profits decrease. Under the two price competition, Carriers adopt in equilibrium pure component pricing strategies and there is a conflict between profit-maximization of carriers and welfare-maximization.