The position of Wittgenstein’s philosophy in the development of philosophy of science holds a role of crucial importance. However, this position refers practically to the early philosophy of Wittgenstein. With regard to Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, we are aware of the fact that its reference to philosophy of science is rarely mentioned. Basing on this fact, this article intends to argue that Wittgenstein’s later philosophy not only closely relates to philosophy of science, but also plays an important role during the years of 1960S when the main trends of philosophy of science undergo transitional changes. This article concentrates its argument on the following five points: First, interpreting Wittgenstein’s text by explaining the idea that his divergent views of the relationship between philosophy and science refer to the difference between his early and later philosophies. Secondly, corresponding to Wittgenstein’s early and later philosophies, a similar change of attitudes equally took place in philosophy of science during 1960S. thirdly, influencing the Vienna Circle, Wittgenstein’s ‘principle of verification’ turned out to be a focal point of discussion. The fourth part will contribute to Wittgenstein’s changing interpretations of ‘the principle of verification’, referring to the difference between his early and later philosophies. The final point argues that the so-called ‘post-positivistic philosophy of science’ developed under the influence of the later philosophy of Wittgenstein. In conclusion, we affirms the stand that under the influence of Wittgenstein, philosophy of since is engaged with a significant change of progress by taking the practical aspects of science into account.