基於農會信用部與會員間存在資訊不對稱的問題，本研究採用代理理論的觀點，以Holmstrom (1979) 的模式為基礎，透過主理人與代理人的效用函數極大化的條件，進行農會信用部負責人的薪酬設計與信用部負責人激勵與監督管理問題的瞭解。 在農會恢復股金制的假設下，透過理論模式的推衍，本研究發現在資訊不對稱的情況下，且農會信用部負責人為風險迴避者時，隨著股金分配率的增加，負責人的努力水準將會提升，因此具有激勵的效果。此外，主理人與代理人的邊際替代率大於不存在資訊不對稱時的情況，故具有監督與管理的效果，雖存在資訊不對稱，但仍對主理人有利。

From the viewpoint of agency theory, this paper constructs models based the model of Holmstrom (1979) to explore the information asymmetry problems between the executives of Credit Departments of Farmers’ Associations and the members. By maximizing the utilities of principals and agents, the relation between compensation scheme and observability of the executives is discussed. On the assumption that the system of stock dividend is adopted again, it is shown that the effort level of the executives increases with the sharing of stock dividend when information asymmetry exists and the executives are risk-averse. The system of stock dividend could be used as a mechanism to encourage the executives. Besides, the marginal rate of substitution between the principles and the agents is larger than the one when information asymmetry does not exist. In this situation, it is beneficial to the principles, and the system of stock dividend has the functions of monitoring and management as well.