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題名:資訊不對稱與可支配現金流量對股利政策影響之研究
書刊名:中原企管評論
作者:黃旭輝 引用關係葉春岑 引用關係
作者(外文):Huang, Hsu-hueiYeh, Chun-tsen
出版日期:2005
卷期:3:2
頁次:頁17-36
主題關鍵詞:代理問題股利政策資訊不對稱成長機會可支配現金流量Agency problemDividend policyInformation asymmetryGrowth opportunityFree cash flow
原始連結:連回原系統網址new window
相關次數:
  • 被引用次數被引用次數:期刊(1) 博士論文(0) 專書(0) 專書論文(0)
  • 排除自我引用排除自我引用:1
  • 共同引用共同引用:0
  • 點閱點閱:44
Easterbrook(1984)認為股利的發放,可提高企業至證券市場籌資的可能性,藉由證券主管機關以及承銷商的外部監督將可有效降低權益 代理問題。本研究依據Easterbrook所提出的觀點,驗證資訊不對稱、可支配現金流量與成長機會對股利政策的影響,本文的研究對象為民國82 年至89年臺灣上市公司的股利發放,樣本共計2105個,實證結果發現,為了降低代理問題,資訊不對稱愈高或可支配現金流量愈高的公司,其 股利發放比率也較高;成長機會較高的公司則會發放較少的股利。
Easterbrook (1984) related dividend policy and the agency problems. He indicated dividend payment would force company to raise their funds from capital markets, and lead to lessen agency problems by outside mechanisms of monitoring. Following Easterbrook's argument, we explore the impacts of asymmetric information, free cash flow and growth opportunity on dividend payment. Our sample includes 2105 event companies listed on Taiwan Stock Exchange during 1993-2000. Evidences show that: Firstly, to reduce agency problems, companies with higher information asymmetry are associated with higher dividends. Secondly, free cash flow has positive effect on dividend payment. Finally, we found that companies with higher growth opportunity would pay fewer dividends.
期刊論文
1.Moon, Kenneth P.、Bathala, Chenchuramaiah T.、Rao, Ramesh P.(1994)。Managerial Ownership, Debt Policy, and the Impact of Institutional Holdings: An Agency Perspective。Financial Management,23(3),38-50。  new window
2.Lambert, R.、Larcker, D.(1985)。Executive compensation, corporate decision making and shareholder wealth: A review of the evidence。Midland Corporate Finance Journal,2,6-22。  new window
3.Miller,M. H.、F. Modigliani(1961)。Dividend Policy, Growth, and the Value of Shares。Journal of Business,34,411-433。  new window
4.McNichols, M.、Dravid, A.(1990)。Stock splits and signaling。Journal of Finance,45,857-880。  new window
5.Oviatt, Benjamin M.(1988)。Agency and Transaction Cost Perspectives on the Manger-Shareholder Relationship: Incentives for Congruent Interests。Academy of Management Review,13(2),214-225。  new window
6.Datta, S.、Datta, M. I.、Patel, A.(2000)。Some evidence on the uniqueness of initial public debt offerings。Journal of Finance,55(2),715-743。  new window
7.Lloyd, W. P.、Jahera, J. S. Jr.、Page, D. E.(1985)。Agency Costs and Dividend-Payout Ratios。Quarterly Journal of Business & Economics,24(3),19-29。  new window
8.Kalay, Avner(1982)。Stockholder-Bondholder Conflict and Dividend Constraints。Journal of Financial Economics,10(2),211-233。  new window
9.Zwiebel, Jeffrey(1996)。Dynamic Capital Structure under Managerial Entrenchment。American Economic Review,86(5),1197-1215。  new window
10.La Porta, Rafael、Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio、Shleifer, Andrei、Vishny, Robert W.(2000)。Agency Problems and Dividend Policies around the World。Journal of Finance,55(1),1-33。  new window
11.Rozeff, Michael S.(1982)。Growth, beta and agency costs as determinants of dividend payout ratios。Journal of Financial Research,5(3),249-259。  new window
12.Miller, Merton H.、Rock, Kevin(1985)。Dividend policy under asymmetric information。The Journal of Finance,40(4),1031-1051。  new window
13.Smith, Clifford W. Jr.、Warner, Jerold B.(1979)。On Financial Contracting: An Analysis of Bond Covenants。Journal of Financial Economics,7(2),117-161。  new window
14.Easterbrook, Frank Hoover(1984)。Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends。American Economic Review,74(4),650-659。  new window
15.Schooley, Diane K.、Barney, Dwayne L. Jr.(1994)。Using Dividend Policy and Managerial Ownership to Reduce Agency Costs。Journal of Financial Research,17(3),363-373。  new window
16.Chung, Kee H.、Charoenwong, Charlie(1991)。Investment Options, Assets in Place, and the Risk of Stocks。Financial Management,20(3),21-33。  new window
17.Lehn, Kenneth、Poulsen, Annette(1989)。Free Cash Flow and Stockholder Gains in Going Private Transactions。The Journal of Finance,44(3),771-787。  new window
18.Fama, Eugene F.、Jensen, Michael C.(1983)。Separation of ownership and control。The Journal of Law & Economics,26(2),301-325。  new window
19.Gaver, Jennifer J.、Gaver, Kenneth M.(1993)。Additional evidence on the association between the investment opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend, and compensation policies。Journal of Accounting and Economics,16(1-3),125-160。  new window
20.Smith, Clifford W. Jr.、Watts, Ross L.(1992)。The Investment Opportunity Set and Corporate Financing, Dividend, and Compensation Policies。Journal of Financial Economics,32(3),263-292。  new window
21.Lang, Larry、Ofek, Eli、Stulz, Rene M.(1996)。Leverage, investment and firm growth。Journal of Financial Economics,40(1),3-29。  new window
22.Lewellen, Wilbur、Loderer, Claudio、Martin, Kenneth(1987)。Executive compensation contracts and executive incentive problems: An empirical analysis。Journal of Accounting and Economics,9(3),287-310。  new window
23.Jensen, Michael C.(1986)。Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers。The American Economic Review,76(2),323-329。  new window
24.Lintner, John(1956)。Distribution of incomes of corporations among dividends, retained earnings, and taxes。American Economic Review,46(2),97-113。  new window
25.Jensen, Michael C.、Meckling, William H.(1976)。Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure。Journal of Financial Economics,3(4),305-360。  new window
26.Bhattacharya, S.(1979)。Imperfect Information, Dividend Policy, and "The Bird in the Hand" Fallacy。Bell Journal of Economics,10,259-270。  new window
27.Eisemann, P. C.、Moses, E. A.(197807)。Stock Dividends: Management’s View。Financial Analysts Journal,77-85。  new window
圖書
1.O'Barr, W. M.、Conley, J. M.(1992)。Fortune and folly: the wealth and power of institutional investing。Homewood. IL:Irwin。  new window
2.Barnea, Amir、Haugen, Robert A.、Senbet, Lemma W.(1985)。Agency Problems and Financial Contracting。Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey:Prentice-Hall Inc.。  new window
其他
1.晁群祥(1994)。公司成長機與融資、股利政策之實證硏究--以台灣上市公司爲例。  延伸查詢new window
2.謝明翰(2000)。企業成長機會與融資政策、股利政策及高階主管酬勞之關聯件硏究。  延伸查詢new window
3.闕河士(1996)。股票股利訊號發射模式與宣告效果之硏究。  延伸查詢new window
4.闕河士、黃旭輝(1997)。成長機會與股票股利關係之實證硏究--代理問題觀點。  延伸查詢new window
5.Bhagat, S., Marr, M., Thompson, R.(1985)。The Rule 415 Experiment: Equity Markets。  new window
6.Blackwell, D., Marr, M.. Spivey, M.(1990)。Shelf Registration and the Reduced due Diligence Argument: Implications of the Underwriter Certification and the Implicit Insurance Hypotheses。  new window
7.Dempsey, S. J. and G. Laber(1992)。Effects of Agency and Transaction Costs on Dividend Payout Ratios: Further Evidence of The Agency-Transaction Hypothesis。  new window
8.Hart, O. and J., Moore(1994)。A Theory of Debt Based on Inalienability of Human Capital。  new window
9.Lakonishok, J. and B. Lev(1987)。Stock Splits, and Stock Dividends: Why, Who, When。  new window
10.Lewellen, W., K. Stanley, R. Lease, and G. Schlarbaum(1978)。Some Direct Evidence on The Dividend Clientele Phenomenon。  new window
11.Milgrom, P. and J. Roberts(1992)。Economics, Organizations and Management。  new window
12.Pettit, R.(1977)。Taxes, Transactions Cost and Clientele Effects of Dividends。  new window
13.Poterba, J. and L., summers(1985)。The Economic. Effects of Dividend Taxation, In Edward Altman and Marti Subramanyam, Eds.。  new window
 
 
 
 
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