The purpose of this article mainly lies in understanding Hsün Tsu regarding Mencius’ inheritance and development about standpoint of life-and-death. According to our discussion, although both Hsün Tsu and Mencius adopted the different passage of life-and-death, but basically they adhere to Confucius’ moral route. Except that, Hsün Tsu stressed on objective constitution, whereas, Mencius stressed on subjective constitution. Due to different emphasis, Hsün Tsu is not likely to place the transcendence of life-and-death on the basis of subjective conscience such as Mencius, rather then on the unity of objective propriety and righteousness. By this way, Hsün Tsu no longer emphasized the transcendent moral Heaven, but trended to community. This swerve not only caused Confucianism’s viewpoint of life-and-death missing out the metaphysical eternal foundation, leaving only the profane experience,, furthermore, solving the common misunderstood of Confucius’ point of view of ‘If we do not yet know about life, how can we know about death?’(or“ Not knowing life, let alone death”.)