二○○三年十月至二○○五年三月，有關解除歐盟對中國武器禁運成為一項外交危機，以及歐盟與中國、歐盟會員國、美國、台灣及日本間密集談判之焦點。然而，一九八九年武器禁運乃是一項沒有法律拘束力之政治宣言，並不能完全阻止歐洲軍事設施對中國之銷售。另外，宣言也不是唯一以及主要架構用以管制歐盟會員國對中國從事科技與軍事相關的出口。為什麼某些國家急於將它解除，而其他國家堅持歐盟應該不計代價予以維持。本文論證解除武器禁運引發之國際危機乃是一項結合象徵與策略動機之產物。運用巴利．歐尼爾著作有關國際政治象徵面向之概念架構 (O’Neill, 2001)，本文區分訊息象徵與焦點象徵。藉由解除武器禁運，歐盟領導者意圖單獨向中國發送一項象徵性訊息，然而解除武器禁運之形式對廣泛旁觀者仍產生一項沒有必要的焦點象徵，亦即歐洲國家將對中國出售武器。歐盟領導者事先沒有預見這項對中國象徵訊息之變化，以及就大部分而言，並不意味已產生該項焦點象徵。

From October 2003 to March 2005, the prospect of lifting the European Union’s (EU) arms embargo on China grew into a diplomatic crisis, and the focus of an intense bargaining between China, the EU, the EU member states, the U.S., Taiwan and Japan. However, the 1989 arms embargo is a non-legally binding political declaration that never fully prevented the selling of European military equipment to China. Furthermore, it is neither the only, nor the principal, mechanism governing EU member states’ technological and military related exports to China. Why do some actors so badly want to have it lifted, while others insist that the EU should maintain it at all costs? The paper argues that the international crisis triggered by lifting the arms embargo was the product of a combination of symbolic and strategic dynamics. Employing a conceptual framework inspired by the work of Barry O’Neill on the symbolic dimensions of international politics, this paper distinguishes between message symbols and focal symbols. By lifting the arms embargo, EU leaders wanted to send a symbolic message exclusively to China, but the form that they used—lifting the arms embargo—created an unwanted focal symbol that reached a wider audience: Europeans will sell arms to China. EU leaders did not foresee this transformation of their symbolic message to China and, for the most part, had not meant to create that focal symbol.