本文以處理亞理斯多德在《尼各馬科倫理學》第五書第八章所發展的法律責任理論為主題。基本上，亞理斯多德是以道德責任的角度來思考法律責任的問題：法律責任同樣是以行為之自願性為條件。本文欲指出，亞理斯多德以道德責任作為法律責任的基礎，基本上是為了要提供一個有關「惡行」的基本界定。此外，亞理斯多德這種作法，其實也是為了要提供一個更好的法庭說服方式，以解決惡行的法律責任問題。 亞理斯多德的道德責任理論之基本構想在於，惡行並非出自偶然的原因，而是出自行為者的惡習、過量的情緒等等惡劣的靈魂內在狀態；這些乃是惡行「非偶然的」內在動因。惡行出自惡劣的內在心理狀態，乃是惡行自願性的基礎，亦構成了它道德上該被責備、法律上該受懲罰的理由。 除了自願的惡行以外，亞理斯多德相當一致地，亦從道德責任的立場來處理非自願行為的責任問題。因此，他區分了「可原諒的」以及「不可原諒的非自願行為」；後者主要指出於酒醉、憤怒以及疏失等「處於無知」的行為。這些行為，雖然原則上可被歸類為非自願的，但亞理斯多德從道德責任的角度，卻將其視同自願犯行；因為，這些行為乃是應受責備的。

The main topic of this article is Aristotle’s theory of legal responsibility which he developed in the Nicomachean Ethics v 8. In fact, Aristotle’s view of legal responsibil¬ity derives from his theory of moral responsibility. That is, he considered voluntariness of actions, originally serving as a condition for moral appraisal, equally to be a decisive concept of assigning legal responsibility. In this article I will argue that Aristotle thereby intends to give in outline an account of what “doing injustice” is, which was a fundamental question of the Athenian law. Furthermore, I will argue that by considering criminal acts in terms of moral views, Aristotle proposes to offer a better form of forensic persuasion concerning the question of assigning legal responsibility. The central claim of Aristotle’s moral theory is that actions of injustice are not simply done accidentally; they are rather produced by vicious states of character or exceedingly strong passions of wrongdoers. These are the intrinsic causal powers in terms of which wrongdoers do their actions “non-accidentally”. The way actions of injustice are produced non-accidentally illustrates also how they are voluntary: they are done by wrongdoers voluntarily to the extent that they are resulting from their defective states of mind. This also gives the reason why voluntary wrongdoers are morally blameworthy and legally punishable. In addition to voluntary actions of injustice, Aristotle considers the question of establishing responsibility for involuntary actions equally from a moral point of view. So he distinguished, among involuntary wrongdoings, the pardonable from the unpardonable like the actions done in ignorance due to drunkenness, anger or negligence. Actions of this sort, though principally being classified as involuntary, are considered by Aristotle to be analogous to voluntary ones, since from the perspective of moral responsibility they are blameworthy.