合作廣告是通路協調中的一種成本分攤與決策分享的機制，其中垂直式合作廣告指的是製造商與零售商、或批發商與零售商共同分攤廣告。在過去的文獻中，大部份對於合作廣告的研究，都聚焦在「製造商為領導者、零售商為跟隨者」的關係上。這意味著傳統上，製造商比零售商更具有優勢。但是近十年來，行銷通路出現了許多重大變革，隨著大型零售鏈的出現改變了以往製造商領導掛帥的通路生態，許多配銷通路的權力由製造商移轉到零售商身上，零售商權力逐漸抬頭，甚至凌駕製造商之上。基於此新市場趨勢，本研究發展了代表製造商權力較大的補助比例模式；並以此模式為基礎，分別探討零售商為通路領導者、製造商為通路領導者及雙方權力相當等不同通路權力狀況下之賽局模型。文中探討零售商與製造商如何決定最佳的地區性廣告支出及製造商對零售商地區性廣告之補助金額，並就整體供應鏈利益與成員自身利益的角度，了解邊際利潤對雙方合作廣告支出與補助政策之影響，以提供雙方決策之參考。最後將均衡結果帶入雙方及供應鏈報酬函數，以比較不同賽局雙方及供應鏈系統偏好變化。

Cooperative advertising is one kind of channel coordination mechanism in marketing domain. Manufacturer and retailer with a supply chain must share common responsibility on national and local advertising for sales promotion activities. In the literature of cooperative advertising, the focus is almost on a relationship in which the manufacturer is the leader and the retailer is the follower. Several reviews on market structure show that a shift of retailing power from manufacturer to retailers has occurred recently. Based on this new market shift we intend to explore the role of vertical cooperative efficiency with respect to transactions between a manufacturer and a retailer through national advertising, local advertising expenditures, and sharing rules of advertising expenses. In a game-theoretic setting, we show that different gaming structures in a supply chain might influence the manufacturer's cooperative advertising subsidization proportion policy. We borrow the concept from Stackelberg and Nash equilibrium to analyze several cooperative advertising games. After solving the non-cooperative equilibriums, we show that the strategies on both sides will depend not only on the gaming structure, but also on the marginal profit. Economic insight along with a lot of interesting propositions are subsequently provided to help decision makers develop more effective strategies. Our effort calls for the game theory to be an essential tool in the analysis of cooperative advertising in a supply chain where multiple agents pursue separate and conflicting objectives.