The law against trading in security markets with the benefit of material, nonpublic information has been developed case-by-case un-der the Article 10b of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The Act defines insider trading as security fraud. However, who is “eligible” to be a fraudster/insider in insider trading has been a controversial issue. The U.S. Supreme Court in Chiarella applied a fiduciary theory to de-fine insiders. Then in 1997, in O’Hagan, the Court applied misap-propriation theory, holding that if an individual breaches a duty within a pre-existing relationship of trust or confidence with the source of the inside information, he is to be considered an insider. The Court, on the one hand, adopted a broader definition of insiders; on the other hand, it emphasized that O’Hagan did not overrule the aforementioned fiduciary theory in Chiarella. Therefore, after O’Hagan, the SEC and lower courts tried to clarify the matter by as-serting that in situations in which a "pre-existing relationship" exists, a fiduciary relationship is established between a tipper and a tipee. However, that issue is, as yet, unsettled despite a decade of argument. This article focuses on the tension between these two different theories. By analyzing recent cases in the lower courts, this article seeks to determine how the theories have been applied and inter-preted after O’Hagan, and how the courts and SEC have responded to the challenges posed by security fraud.