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題名:美國與我國證券交易法私募有價證券之比較研究
作者:李靜平
校院名稱:東吳大學
系所名稱:法律學系
指導教授:潘維大
學位類別:博士
出版日期:2019
主題關鍵詞:私募普通股代理成本經營判斷原則內部人利益衝突再行賣出短線交易內線交易agency costprivate placement common stockappraisal rightssecondary distributionresale the holding periodbusiness judgment ruleconflict of interestsinsider tradingshort-swing trading
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依證券交易法第43條之6第1項規定公開發行公司辦理私募應經股東會特別決議,惟於授權資本制度下,董事會籌措公司營運資金之方式採用私募方式,實屬董事會經營判斷原則,應受經營判斷原則保護,前開規定董事會辦理私募有價證券應經股東會特別決議程序是否徒增股東代理成本。經探究董事會與股東會權限分配,再實證瞭解上市櫃公司多屬股權集中,公司經營權委由董事會經營較有利於股東。建議應修正同法規定,辦理私募普通股達影響流通股數20%以上者始經股東會決議,此時,倘發行人為營運正常公司與每股淨值十元以上,且應募人為策略性投資人時,應增列對異議股東行使股份收買請求權。未達20%者經董事會通過即可,以利資本市場運作更具效率。
依同法訂定之「公開發行公司辦理私募有價證券應注意事項」,倘營運虧損之上市櫃公司辦理私募普通股增資,多內部人(關係人)參與認購,除應予迴避不得參與董事會討論及表決外,多以不低於約當市價八折方式參與認購。惟現行規定無法減少內部人(關係人)之利益衝突,且審計委員會無法扮演「獨立」與「專業」審查角色。經參考美國司法判決對內部人(關係人)利益衝突解決方法,認為對內部人(關係人)或策略性投資人認購私募普通股,應回歸公司治理之精神。建議董事會設計內部程序進行經營判斷原則之事前審查機制,嗣發現發行人辦理私募普通股涉有不法交易應進行事後司法審查。另認購私募普通股之公允價格涉及諸多攸關因素。建議增訂授權主管機關訂定行政規則,提高「公開發行公司辦理私募有價證券應注意事項」之法律位階,且應以交易價格區間方式為認購價格。
另依證券交易法第43條之8第1項第2款規定,持有私募有價證券之人依主管機關所訂持有期間及交易數量,轉讓予符合主管機關所定條件之自然人、法人或基金之閉鎖期為1以年上至3年期間內,同條第1項第3款規定,持有私募有價證券之閉鎖期滿3年後轉讓不受限制,而實務上,發行人應再取得監理機構對其有價證券之上市櫃核准函後,始能將該等私募有價證券於公開市場自行轉讓股票予不特定之投資人,閉鎖期過長增加應募人之不確定因素。另私募有價證券未經核准上市櫃買賣時為「限制性證券」,如內部人利用持有發行人資訊於公開市場先出售老股,再低價認購私募有價證券(新股),應屬短線交易及內線交易規範之範圍。建議縮短持有私募有價證券再行賣出之閉鎖期,並將內部人出售持有之老股再認購私募(新股)之行為納入短線交易及內線交易之範圍,以建構公平與效率之資本市場,以落實私募普通股之公司治理而達到「為發展國民經濟,並保障投資」之宗旨。
In accordance with the Article 43-6 of the Securities and Exchange Act, the private placement of a company shall be subject to a special resolution of the shareholders' meeting. Under the authorized capital system, raising capital by private placement should be the authorities of the board of directors based on their business judgment rule, and should be protect by business judgment rule. It is worthy discussion whether the above-mentioned regulation increases the agent cost for shareholders. Pursuant to the Company Act Article 202 corporate governance of companies is generally based on the Board of Directors superiority, and it is practical that companies operation is entrusted with the Board of Directors by shareholders. Accordingly, it is suggested that Article 43-6 of the Securities and Exchange Act be amended to permit private placement in principle to be approved by the Board of Directors. Further, it is suggested that the private placement has, or will have, upon issuance, to or in excess of 20 percent of the voting power outstanding before the issuance thereof, must acquire approval of the shareholders present at a meeting. Also, if the issuer is a normal operating company with a net worth over NT$10 in addition that the subscriber is categorized as strategic investor, appraisal right should be provided to dissenting shareholders to request the company to purchase their shares by amending related regulation in order to enhance the efficiency of the capital market.
Pursuant to Article 43-6 of the Securities and Exchange Act and the Direction for Public Companies Conducting Private Placement of Securities, if the listed company with operating losses and the insider (related party) participates in the private placement of common stock, the aforesaid insider shall enter recusal during discussions and voting on that item, and may not act as another director's proxy to exercise voting rights over that matter. And, such participation is usually no more than 80 percent of the reference price (the theoretical price) which is the price per share of the privately placed common shares. In previous cases, current rules and regulations however cannot reduce the conflict of interests of insiders; neither the audit committee can play a role to review with "independent" and "professional" methods. This thesis makes reference to the method of conflict resolution of insider (related party) under the U.S. judicial decisions. It is suggested that increasing the relevant regulations shall be prescribed by the competent authority and the transaction price range should not be used as the current price, and the deletion of the provision regulating that the price per share of the privately placed common shares should not be lower than 80 percent of the reference price.
Purchasers of privately placed securities are subject to restrictions on lock-up period and trading volume. In accordance with the Article 43-8 paragraph 1 subparagraph 2 of the Securities and Exchange Act, purchasers of privately placed securities may transfer the securities to qualified natural persons, juristic persons or funds within 1 year to 3 years after the purchase of the securities. In accordance with the Article 43-8 paragraph 1 subparagraph 3 of the Securities and Exchange Act, the lock-up period is 3 years. This paper focuses on the regulation over re-sale of privately placed securities in U.S.A and Taiwan, particularly the holding period and transfer methods. This paper suggests shortening the holding period restrictions and subjecting the sale of issued securities and purchase of privately placed securities to the regulation over insider trading and short-swing trading so to establish a fair and efficient market.
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(四)中文判決
臺灣板橋地方法院87年司字第124號民事判決。

臺灣板橋地方法院95年度金字第3號民事判決。

臺灣臺北地方法院95年司字第1073號民事裁定。

臺灣桃園地方法院105年度抗字第230號民事裁定。

臺灣桃園地方法院96年訴字第679號民事判決。

臺灣高等法院96年抗字第894號民事判決。

臺灣臺北地方法院105年金訴字第677號民事判決。

臺灣臺北地方法院106年金訴字第6號刑事判決。

臺灣高等法院98年金上字第9號民事判決。

臺灣高等法院103年度金上重更(三)字第15號民事判決。

臺灣高等法院102年重金上更(一)字第4號刑事判決。

臺灣高等法院104年金上更(一)字第14號刑事判決。

最高法院97年台上字第2729號判例。

最高法院96年台上字第2000號民事判決。
最高法院98年度台上字第1302號民事判決。
最高法院101年金上訴字第42號刑事判決。

最高法院102年台上字第1011號民事判決。

最高法院102年台上字第1672號刑事判決。

最高法院103年台上字第2719號民事判決。

最高法院103年台上字第4441號刑事判決。

最高法院104年金上重訴(二)字第8號刑事判決。

最高法院104年台上字第559號刑事判決。

最高法院104年台上字第78號刑事判決。

最高法院105年台上字第2063號刑事判決。

最高法院106年台上字第1738號刑事判決。

(五)報紙資料

蘋果日報:台股近10年本國自然人交易金額,B2版,2017年2月2日。

工商時報:論私募普通股上市的不確定性-阻礙外資參與台灣資本市場的絆腳石,A7版,2014年5月3日。

(六)其他資料

南亞科技股份有限公司100年度股東會年報。

南亞科技股份有限公司101年度股東會年報。

南亞科技股份有限公司104年度股東會年報。

南亞科技股份有限公司105年度股東會年報。

台灣高鐵股份有限公司105年度股東會年報。

台灣高鐵股份有限公司106年度股東會年報。
二、外文參考文獻
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(二)英文期刊
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Easterbrook, Frank H., et al., The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416 (1989).

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Fischel, Daniel R., The Appraisal Remedy in Corporate Law, AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 875 (1983).
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Hayden, Grant, et al., Shareholder Democracy and the Curious Turn Toward Board Primacy, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2071 (2010).

Heminway, Joan Macleod, Crowdfunding And The Public/Private Divide in U.S. Securities Regulation, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 477 (2014).

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Hicks, J. William, The Concept of Transaction as A Restraint on Resale Limitations, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 417 (1988).

Hill, Claire A., et al., Stone v. Ritter and the Expanding Duty of Loyalty, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1769 (2007).

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Reich-Graefe, René, Deconstructing Corporate Governance: Absolute Director Primacy, 5 BROOK. J. CORP FIN. & COM. L. 341 (2011).

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Robert, B. Thompson, Preemption and Federalism in Corporate Governance: Protecting Shareholder Rights to Vote, Sell, and Sue, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 215 (1999).

Rodrigues, Usha, A Conflict Primacy Model of the Public Board, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1051 (2013).

Rodrigues, Usha, Corporate Governance in an Age of Separation of Ownership from Ownership, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1822 (2011).

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Schwartz, Andrew A., The Perpetual Corporation, 80 G. WASH. L. REV. 764 (2012).

Sharfman, Bernard S., Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corporation: A Small but Significant Step Forward in the War Against Frivolous Shareholder Lawsuit, 40 J. CORP L. 197 (2014).

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(三)法院判決
Ackerberg v. Johnson, 892 F. 2d 1328 (8th Cir 1989).
Ark. Valley Agric Soc’y v. Eihholtz, 25 P. 613 (1891).
Aronoff v. Albanese, 85 A. D. 2d 3 (1982).
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A. 2d 805 (Del. 1984).
Basic Inc v. Levinson, 485 U. S. 224 (1988).
Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp., 413 A. 2d 137 (1980).
Blasius Industries Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A. 2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988).
Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U. S. 132 (U. S. 1891).

Cady Roberts & Co., 40 S. E. C., 907 (1961).

Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A. 2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
Cavalie Oil Corp. v. Harnett, 564 A. 2d 1137 (Del. 1989).
Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, 634 A. 2d 345 (Del. 2006).
Central Bank of Denver N. A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver N. A., 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).

Cohen v. Ayers, 596 F. 2d 733 (7th Cir. 1979).

Consumers Power Co. Derivative Litig., 132 F. R. D. 455 (Del. 1994).

Cookies Food Products Inc. v. Lakes Warehouse Distributing, Inc., 430 N. W. 2d 447 (Iowa. 1988)

Cramer v. General Tel. & Elecs Corp., 582 F. 2d 259 (3th Cir. 1978).

Dirk v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459 (1919).
Doran v. Petroleum Management Corp., 545 F. 2d 893 (5th Cir 1977).
Emerald Partner v. Berlin 787 A. 2d 1215 (Del. 2001).
Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A. 2d 814 (N. J. 1981).
Gagliardi v. Trifoods International Inc., 683 A. 2d 1059 (Del. Ch. 1996).
Garfield v. Stain, 320 F. 2d 116 (10th Cir. 1963).
Gilbert v. Nixon, 429 F. 2d 348 (10th Cir. 1970).
Gilligan Will & Co. v. SEC, 361 U. S. 896 (1959).

Globe Woolen Co. v. Utica Gas & Electric Co., 121 N.E. 378 (1978).

Godbold v. Branch Bank, 11 Ala. 191 (Ala. 1847).

Goodwin v. Aggasiz, 180 N. E. 659 (Mass.1933).

Gordon v. Drews, 358 S.C. 598 (2004).

Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co., 188 A. 2d 125 (Del. 1963).

Grobow v. Perot, 539 A. 2d 180, 188 (Del. 1988).
Guth v. Loft Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255 (Del. 1939).
Hansen v. 75 Ranch Co., 288 Mont. 310 (1998).
Hill York Corp. v. American International, 448 F. 2d 680 (1971).

Kahn v. Lynch Commc’c Sys Inc., 638 A. 2d 1110 (Del. 1994).
Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp., 88 A. 3d 635 (2014).
Kamin v. American Express Co., 383 N.Y.S. 2d 807 (Sup. Ct. 1976).

Lake Monticello Owners’ Ass’n v. Lake, 463 S. E. 2d 652 (Va. 1995).

Levine v. Smith, 591 A. 2d 194 (Del. 1994).

Lively v. Hirschfeld, 440 F.2d 631 (10th Cir. 1971)

Lukens Inc Shareholder Litigation, 757 A. 2d 720 (Del. Ch. 1999).

Lyondell Chemical Co. v. Ryan, 970 A. 2d 235 (Del. 2009).
Marshall v. Farmer’s & Mechs’ Sav. Bank, 8 S. E. 586 (Va. 1889).
MM Companies Inc. v. Liquid Audio Inc., 813 A. 2d 1118 (Del. Ch. 1994).
NYMEX Shareholder Litigation, 2009 WL 3206051 (Del. Ch. 2009).
Paramount Communication Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A. 2d 34 (Del. 1994).
Percy v. Millaudon, 8 Mart. (n. s.) 68 (La. 1829).
Poole v. N. V. Deli Maatschappij, 243 A. 2d 67 (1968).
Rales v. Balsband, 634 A. 2d 927 (Del. 1993).
Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard Dandini Co., 109 Cal. App. 2d 405 (Cal. 1952).
Revlon Inc. v. Macandrews & Fobes Holding, 506 A. 2d 173 (Del.1986).
RJR Nabisco Inc. v. Shareholder Litigation, 582 F. 2d 259 (3d Cir. 1978).

Santa Fe Pacific Corp. Shareholder Litigation, 669 A. 2d 59 (1995).

SEC v. Cavanagh, 445 F. 3d 105 (2d Cir 2006).

SEC v. Cuban, 620 F. 3d 551 (5th Cir. 2010).

SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U. S. 119, 73 S. Ct 981, 97 L. Ed 1494 (1953).

SEC v. Rocklage, 470 F. 3d 1 (1st Cir. 2006).

SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F. 2d 833 (1968).

Securities and Exchange Commission v. Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association Inc., 120 F. 2d 738 (1941).

Shelensky v. Wrigley, 237 N. E. 2d 776 (Ill. App. 1968).

Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A. 2d 858 (Del. 1984).

Smurfit-Stone Container Corp., 2011 WL 2028076 (Del. Ch. 2011).

Stepak v. Addition, 20 F. 3d 398 (11th Cir. 1994).

Stone v. Ritter, 911 A. 2d 362 (Del. 2006).

Strassburger v. Earley, 752 A. 2d 557 (2000).
Tri-Continental Corp. v. Battye, 31 Del. Ch. 523 (1950).
The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, 907 A. 2d 693 (2005).

U.S. v. Wolfson, 405 F. 2d 779 (2d Cir. 1968).

United States v. Bryan, 58 F. 3d 933 (4th Cir. 1995).

United States v. Chestman, 917 F. 2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991).

United States v. Falcone, 257 F. 3d 226 (2d Cir. 2001).

United States v. Newman, 464 U. S. 863, 15-17 (2d Cir. 1983).

United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U. S. 642, 642-44 (1997).

United States v. O’Hagan, 92 F. 3d 612 (8th Cir. 1996).

Unitrin Inc. v. American General Corp., 651 A. 2d 1361 (1995).
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A. 2d 946 (Del. 1985).
Washington Bancorp v. Said, 812 F. Supp. 1256 (D. D. C. 1993).
Weinberger v. UOP, 457 A. 2d 701 (Del. 1981).
Zupnick v. Goizueta, 698 A. 2d 384 (1997).


 
 
 
 
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