本文分成兩個部分。在第一個部分，整理伯林對於各種「個人在歷史中不需負責」理論的批評。本文指出，他的批評其實包含三個對象：歷史決定論、人力無用論、以及價值相對論。在第二個部分，追問自由主義如何看待個人在歷史中的角色。伯林僅著眼於爭取個人自由選擇的空間。筆者認為，這種對個人自由的消極理解坐實了一般對於自由主義脫離社會、歷史力量的批評。其實個人的選擇與行動，意思並不是擺脫了社會與歷史的控制，而是由於必需提供理由，故在行動中間主動地對環境與行動從事評價。自由主義會認為，個人面對歷史時，既然他的選擇與行動包含了價值判斷，故他是自由的。

This article consists of two parts. The first part discusses Berlin's sprawling criticism of various "history as alibi" doctrines found in theories of historical inevitability, which may be summarized under three headings: historical determinism, human ineffectiveness, and value relativism. The second part examines Berlin's defense of the place of the individual in history. I argue that his negative conception of freedom of choice lends credence to the allegation that for liberalism the individual is free only to the extent that he or she is placed above and beyond history and society. In fact, human intentions and purposes, which as Berlin insisted are characteristic components of free choices, involve making reasoned value judgments by the individual embedded in history. The individual is actively ascribing values to his surroundings and actions, rather than freeing himself from history and society, whenever he is engaged in choices and actions in a historical situation. The individual is free vis-à-vis history to the extent that in his very choices and actions he is the agency of value judgments in history.