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題名:存款保險對金融危機、經濟成長與社會福利的影響
書刊名:經濟論文叢刊
作者:金志婷 引用關係
作者(外文):Chin, Chi-ting
出版日期:2014
卷期:42:1
頁次:頁23-48
主題關鍵詞:存款保險金融危機經濟成長社會福利Deposit insuranceFinancial crisisEconomic growthSocial welfare
原始連結:連回原系統網址new window
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  • 被引用次數被引用次數:期刊(0) 博士論文(0) 專書(0) 專書論文(0)
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  • 共同引用共同引用:8
  • 點閱點閱:33
Diamond and Dybvig (1983)發現存款保險不但可避免存戶擠兌、防堵金融危機的發生,透過採行最適的存款保險,甚至可使社會福利達到極大,不過,該文沒有考慮存款保險對經濟成長的影響。本文考慮了經濟內生成長的架構,發現存款保險將得以阻止單純由民眾預期所引發的銀行擠兌事件,最終有利於長期經濟成長。透過數值分析,我們發現:使得社會福利極大的最適存款保險為部分保障,而Diamond and Dybvig (1983)沒有考慮到存款保險提高經濟成長這項對社會福利的正面影響,導致該文低估最適的存款保險額度。
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) discovered that deposit insurance can prevent both bank runs and financial crises. Moreover, demand deposits might achieve the equilibrium that maximizes social welfare. However, Diamond and Dybvig (1983) neglected the growth effect of deposit insurance. This paper considers endogenous growth and finds that deposit insurance can prevent bank runs due to random withdrawals, resulting in a higher rate of economic growth. Through a simulation, this paper concludes that the optimal deposit insurance to maximize social welfare only offers partial protection, and Diamond and Dybvig (1983) underestimated this optimal deposit insurance since they did not consider the growth effect of deposit insurance.
期刊論文
1.Jacklin, Charles J.、Bhattacharya, Sudipto(1988)。Distinguishing Panics and Information-Based Bank Runs: Welfare and Policy Implications。Journal of Political Economy,96,568-592。  new window
2.Waldo, Douglas G.(1985)。Bank Runs, the Deposit-Currency Ratio and the Interest Rate。Journal of Monetary Economics,15,260-277。  new window
3.Dekle, Robert、Kenneth Kletzer(2003)。The Japanese Banking Crisis and Economic Growth: Theoretical and Empirical Implications of Deposit Guarantees andWeak Financial Regulation。Journal of the Japanese and International Economies,17,305-335。  new window
4.王瑜琳、洪嘉聲(20041200)。農會信用部擠兌與經營狀態之探討--比例危機模型之應用。農業經濟叢刊,10(1),77-100。new window  延伸查詢new window
5.Schumacher, Liliana(2000)。Bank Runs and Currency Run in a System Without a Safety Net: Argentina and the “Tequila” Shock。Journal of Monetary Economics,46,257-277。  new window
6.Alonso, Irasema(1996)。On avoiding bank runs。Journal of Monetary Economics,37,73-87。  new window
7.Chari, V. V.、Jagannathan, Ravi(1988)。Banking panics, information and rational expectations equilibrium。Journal of Finance,43(3),749-763。  new window
8.Cooper, R.、Ross, T. W.(1998)。Bank runs: Liquidity costs and investment distortions。Journal of Monetary Economics,41,27-38。  new window
9.Peck, J.、Shell, K.(2003)。Equilibrium bank runs。Journal of Political Economy,111,103-123。  new window
10.Bencivenga, Valerie R.、Smith, Bruce D.(1991)。Financial Intermediation and Endogenous Growth。Review of Economic Studies,58(2),195-209。  new window
11.Romer, Paul M.(1986)。Increasing Returns and Long Run Growth。Journal of Political Economy,94(5),1002-1037。  new window
12.Diamond, Douglas W.、Dybvig, Phillip H.(1983)。Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity。Journal of Political Economy,91(3),401-419。  new window
13.Loewy, M.B.(1998)。Information-based Bank Runs in a Monetary Economy。Journal of Macroeconomics,20,681-702。  new window
研究報告
1.Dekle, Robert、Kenneth Kletzer(2005)。Deposit Insurance Regulatory Forbearance and Economic Growth: Implications for the Japanese Banking Crisis。International Monetary Fund。  new window
學位論文
1.林銘泉(2011)。金融危機對經濟成長影響之研究:以亞洲國家為例(碩士論文)。臺灣大學。  延伸查詢new window
2.魏正卓(2006)。兩岸存款保險制度之探討(碩士論文)。國立中央大學。  延伸查詢new window
圖書
1.李怡庭(2009)。貨幣銀行與金融市場。台北:翰蘆圖書出版有限公司。  延伸查詢new window
圖書論文
1.Calomiris, Charles W.、Gorton, Gary(1991)。The Origins of Bank Panics: Models, Facts, and Bank Regulation。Financial Markets and Financial Crises。Chicago:University of Chicago Press。  new window
 
 
 
 
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