納斯邦採用沈恩的能力進路之公義論批判羅爾斯的公義論，而且進而批評辛格之動物福利論與雷根之動物權利論。納斯邦宣稱某些對動物保持一種具有尊嚴的生命之能力是動物擁有一些不可被侵犯的基本權利的基礎。納斯邦反對傳統對他人或其他物種的生命有所謂積極與消極義務的區分，而且論證人類對動物的幸福有加以保護的義務。他依此公義論，以生命之繁衍能力為主，列出一組保護動物具有尊嚴生命的能力名單。本文對於這兩種公義之進路進行一批判的評估。本文引用儒家之各盡其性分之道德原則作為對待其他人和動物的基本倫理要求，即讓每一人和一物都能充份發揮所稟有的天賦才能。本文說明各盡其性分的原理衍生自孔子之仁，而且說明何以仁具有道德的和存有論的意涵。本文以各盡其性分原則為人類社會的公義原則。這些才能包括自然的與道德的能力。動物方面以自然能力為主。本文在此延申此原則去涵蓋動物之需求，以及容許某些高等動物具有一定的道德或倫理關係。本文並對納斯邦所強調的，動物能力之政治面相作一批判的審察。同時，相反於納斯邦以同情共感去支持他的論題，本文以儒家之仁或仁心所具有的感通來證立人類與動物關係之方式。本文並對人類與動物的關係提出若干批判的審察。

Employing Amartya Sen's capabilities approach to justice, Martha C. Nussbaum gives a critique of Rawls's theory of justice as well as some critical comments on Peter Singer's theory of animal welfare and Tom Regan's theory of animal rights. Nussbaum establishes the claim that capabilities, at least for those important ones for an animal to retain a sense of dignity of life, are the basic entitlements of animals not to be violated without good reasons. She refutes the traditional distinction of positive and negative duties towards others including other species and argues that human beings have the responsibility to provide protection for the wellbeing of animals. She develops a new theory of justice for animals in terms of capabilities as flourishing and makes up a list of capabilities for a just treatment of animal as a life worthy of dignity. Nussbaum's approach comes very close to Confucianism. This paper will give a critical evaluation and comparison of the two approaches to justice. In this paper I espouse one of the basic moral principles in Confucian ethics as a way to treating others and animals so as to let their inborn talents manifest to the utmost. This Confucian principle is derived from Confucius idea of ren and has both moral and ontological implications. The talentsinclude both natural and moral talents. For animals, natural talents come very close to Nussbaum's idea of capabilities. The principle works as a Confucian principle of justice for human society. It is extended here to encompass the basic needs of animals as well as some possibilities of moral or ethical relationship for some higher animals. Some critical observations of Nussbaum's emphasis on the political aspect of justice of animal capabilities are drawn. In contrast to Nussbaum's employment of compassion in support of her thesis, a justification of the human-animal relation is offered in terms of the kind of trans-species empathy implied in the heart/mind of ren. Finally, a number of critical observations in human-animal relation are drawn.