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題名:公司股權結構是否影響負債融資工具選擇?
書刊名:臺灣企業績效學刊
作者:楊媚靜陳振宇 引用關係周建新 引用關係
作者(外文):Yang, Mei-chingChen, Chen-yuChou, Jian-hsin
出版日期:2013
卷期:6:2
頁次:頁149-170
主題關鍵詞:股權結構債務融資金字塔結構家族企業Ownership structureDebt financingPyramid structureFamily firm
原始連結:連回原系統網址new window
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  • 共同引用共同引用:4
  • 點閱點閱:13
企業的股權結構係影響其代理問題的重要因素,且會進而影響其負債融資決策,亦即債務融資工具之選擇。基於此觀點,本研究企圖探討當公司股權集中度愈高時,企業傾向於發行何種債務融資工具,並進一步探討當企業具金字塔結構或家族企業特徵時,傾向採取何種債務融資工具。實證結果發現,當董監事股權質押比率愈高時,企業傾向以銀行借款方式進行融資。而當經理人持股情形愈高或最終控制持股情形愈嚴重時,企業傾向選擇發行可轉換公司債的融資工具。然而,當企業的盈餘偏離差程度愈大或存在金字塔結構時,傾向以發行公司債進行債務融資。此外,家族控制型態的企業較不會選擇以銀行借款方式進行融資。
The corporate ownership structure is an important determinant that affects firm's agency problem and debt financing strategy, which is the choice of debt financing instrument. According to this perspective, this study attempts to explore that whether firms intend to choose what kind of debt financing instrument if they have a higher ownership concentration. Moreover, this study will investigate that whether firms intend to choose what kind of debt financing instrument if they are the family firms or they have pyramid structure characteristics. The empirical results show that firms with higher the extent of shares as collateral by the board of directors will employ more bank debts. Firms with higher manager ownership or ultimate controlling shareholders will use more convertible debts. However, firms with higher degree of divergence in a controlling shareholder's voting and cash flow rights or the pyramid structure characteristics will employ more public debts. Besides, family firms have a tendency to use less bank debts.
期刊論文
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研究報告
1.Dutordoir, M.、Strong, N. C.、Ziegan, M. C.(2012)。Does corporate governance influence convertible bond issuance?。  new window
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學位論文
1.劉振興(2006)。董監事持股質押與負債工具選擇之研究(碩士論文)。雲林科技大學。  延伸查詢new window
2.李德冠(2001)。公司監理機制對於關係人交易影響之研究(碩士論文)。輔仁大學。  延伸查詢new window
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