本研究旨在從代理理論觀點探究家族所有權與其負債融資成本與股利政策間之關聯性。家族所有權代表著一種大股東的特別型式，而台灣上市公司多數具有股權集中且以家族控制為主體之特徵，因此這些擁用控制權的所有者所引發的代理問題是不可忽視的。以民國87年至91年間有進行融資行為股利宣告的台灣上市公司為研究對象，剔除金融保險業、資料遺漏之公司及極端值後，利用獨立樣本t檢定、迴歸模式及橫斷面與時間序列合併資料模式進行實證分析，首先比較家族公司與非家族公司在融資決策及股利政策上的差異性，再進一步從家族成員所擁有之持股比例探討其與其負債融資成本與股利決策間之關聯性。實證結果如下：在融資決策方面，研究結果顯示，1.家族公司與非家族公司之負債融資成本的負擔並無差異性。2.經營績效與負債融資成本為顯著正相關。3.公司規模與負債融資成本為負相關。在股利政策方面，研究結果顯示，1. 家族公司現金股股利之發放率高於非家族公司。2.家族持股比率對股票股利發放為正向影響。3.績效對現金股利發放為正向影響，對股票股利之發放為顯著負向的影響。4.前期股利發放決策對本期股利發放決策有明顯的影響。5.股票股利發放率在不同產業間確實有顯著差異性。 由實證結果可知，台灣投資人及融資者皆視家族為公司內有效之治理機制，且在進行授信行為時，認為債權人-股東間存在代理問題及代理成本。在股利政策方面，家族公司利用發放現金股利來減輕外部股東對公司存在家族控制股東所引發代理問題之疑慮。

The main objective of this study is to provide an empirical study of the relationship between founding family ownership financing costs and dividend policies from the viewpoint of agency theory. Prior literature estimates that family firms account for 65% to 80% of all businesses in Taiwan. We focus on a prevalent form of undiversified ownership in public firms, that of founding families. Founding families represent a special class of large shareholders that potentially have unique incentive structures relative to atomistic shareholders. The sample includes firms listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange from1998 to 2002. After controlling for industry and firm specific characteristics, our analysis indicates the cost of debt financing for family firms is only 4 basis points lower than in non-family firms. This suggests that creditors do not view founding family ownership as an organizational structure that better protects their interests. Our results also indicate that family firms tend to distribute more stock dividends instead of cash dividends as families’ equity stakes continue to increase. Furthermore, family firms with highly fractional equity ownership use dividends to alleviate some of agent conflicts when one company has good performance. Overall, our investigation suggests that family ownership dose not impact the cost of debt financing. Our results further indicate that family firms pay more cash dividends to mitigate potential agency conflicts with atomistic shareholders.