華日自1996 年8 月即展開的漁業談判，於2013 年4 月10 日正式 簽訂《臺日漁業協議》，雙方避開主權爭議，針對釣魚台海域漁業資源 分享獲致共識，展現我國希望和平解決紛爭的決心。本文分成四個部 分：首先，介紹華日兩國漁業談判與漁業協議之緣起與背景；第二，對 協議洽簽原因進行分析；第三，分析協議簽訂對我之戰略意涵；最後， 探討我國未來釣魚台政策之影響。筆者認為，華日雙方對於漁船於12 浬範圍之內海域作業仍缺乏共識，仍不能排除發生對峙的可能性。此 外，中共在協議簽訂後不久，即派遣海軍船艦、8 艘公務船艦及40 餘 架戰機前往釣魚台地區，強硬維權執法措施已由海上擴及空域，對我海 巡署及東北海空防禦構成嚴峻考驗。我政府相關單位應思考如何針對中 國大陸籍漁船頻繁越界捕魚、「中國海警」進入「協議適用海域」之應 處。

After 17 rounds of negotiations since August 1996, the Republic of China and Japan signed the Taiwan-Japan Fisheries Agreement on April 10, 2013. The two sides reached a consensus on resource sharing without touching sovereign issues, demonstrating the R.O.C. resolute to peacefully solve the disputes. This article is composed of four parts: introduction to the background of the Fisheries Agreement and related negotiations, analysis of factors contributing to the signing of the Agreement, the strategic implication to the R.O.C., and the impact on the R.O.C. future Diaoyutai policy. The author argues that due to the lack of consensus on fishing activities within 12 nautical miles of the Diaoyutai Islands, there are still possible confrontations between the two sides. Additionally, Mainland China’s assertive actions has extended from to sea to air as demonstrated by dispatching the PLA South China Sea fleet, 8 surveillance ships and more than 40 fighter jets to the Diaoyutai area soon after the Agreement. Mainland China’s assertive actions pose tremendous challenges to the R.O.C.’s northeast air defense as well as to the Coast Guard. It is suggested that the R.O.C. government formulate a strategy responding to Mainland China’s frequent cross-border fishing activities and scenarios of Mainland China’s Coast Guard entering the agreement area.