:::

詳目顯示

回上一頁
題名:實踐知識傾向論與其困難
書刊名:國立政治大學哲學學報
作者:蕭銘源
作者(外文):Hsiao, Ming-yuan
出版日期:2022
卷期:48
頁次:頁79-116
主題關鍵詞:實踐知識傾向傾向論智識主義反智識主義Knowledge-howDispositionsThe dispositional account of knowledge-howIntellectualismAnti-intellectualism
原始連結:連回原系統網址new window
相關次數:
  • 被引用次數被引用次數:期刊(0) 博士論文(0) 專書(0) 專書論文(0)
  • 排除自我引用排除自我引用:0
  • 共同引用共同引用:2
  • 點閱點閱:3
期刊論文
1.Bird, A.(1998)。Dispositions and Antidotes。The Philosophical Quarterly,48(191),227-234。  new window
2.Clarke, R.(2008)。Intrinsic Finks。The Philosophical Quarterly,58(232),512-518。  new window
3.Clarke, R.(2010)。Opposing Powers。Philosophical Studies,149(2),153-160。  new window
4.Choi, S.(2008)。Dispositional Properties and Counterfactual Conditionals。Mind,117(468),795-841。  new window
5.Lewis, D.(1997)。Finkish Dispositions。The Philosophical Quarterly,47(187),143-158。  new window
6.Martin, C. B.(1994)。Dispositions and Conditionals。The Philosophical Quarterly,44(174),1-8。  new window
7.Stanley, Jason、Williamson, Timothy(2001)。Knowing How。The Journal of Philosophy,98(8),411-444。  new window
8.Noë, Alva(2005)。Against intellectualism。Analysis,65(4),278-290。  new window
9.蕭銘源(20130200)。傾向條件句分析理論之困難與可能解決方案。東吳哲學學報,27,105-139。new window  延伸查詢new window
10.Ashwell, L.(2010)。Superficial Dispositionalism。Australasian Journal of Philosophy,88(4),635-653。  new window
11.Choi, S.(2012)。Intrinsic Finks and Dispositional/Categorical Distinction。Noûs,46(2),289-325。  new window
12.Choi, S.(2013)。Can Opposing Dispositions Be Co-Instantiated?。Erkenntnis,78(1),161-182。  new window
13.Everett, A.(2009)。Intrinsic Finks, Masks, and Mimics。Erkenntnis,71(2),191-203。  new window
14.Clarke, R.(2009)。Dispositions, Abilities to Act, and Free Will: The New Dispositionalism。Mind,118(470),323-351。  new window
15.Fara, M.(2008)。Masked Abilities and Compatibilism。Mind,117,843-865。  new window
16.Tu, C.、Hsiao, M.、Wang, L.(2015)。Knowledge-How and Performance Success。Philosophia,43(4),1157-1170。  new window
17.Tugby, M.(2016)。On the Reality of Intrinsically Finkable Dispositions。Philosophia,44,623-631。  new window
18.Vetter, B.、Jaster, R.(2017)。Dispositional Accounts of Abilities。Philosophy Compass,12(8),(e12432)1-(e12432)11。  new window
19.Vihvelin, K.(2004)。Free Will Demystified: A Dispositional Account。Philosophical Topics,32(1/2),427-450。  new window
20.蕭銘源(20190300)。新傾向論與內在遮蓋者難題。國立臺灣大學哲學論評,57,49-76。new window  延伸查詢new window
21.蕭銘源(20210800)。可被內在遮蓋的傾向與其存有學問題。東吳哲學學報,44,1-28。new window  延伸查詢new window
22.Cath, Y.(2019)。Knowing How。Analysis,79(3),487-503。  new window
23.Carter, A.、Navarro, J.(2017)。The Defeasibility of Knowledge-How。Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,95,662-685。  new window
24.Constantin, J.(2018)。A Dispositional Account of Practical Knowledge。Philosophical Studies,175,2309-2329。  new window
25.Fara, M.(2005)。Dispositions and Habituals。Noûs,39(1),43-82。  new window
26.Glick, E.(2015)。Practical Modes of Presentation。Noûs,49,538-559。  new window
27.Hawley, K.(2003)。Success and Knowledge-How。American Philosophical Quarterly,40(1),19-31。  new window
28.Kumar, V.(2011)。In support of anti-intellectualism。Philosophical Studies,152,135-154。  new window
29.Khalaj, M. Hosein M. A.(2021)。Knowledge-How and the Problems of Masking and Finkishness。Synthese,198,1623-1641。  new window
30.Mumford, S.(2001)。Realism and the Conditional Analysis of Dispositions: Reply to Malzkorn。The Philosophical Quarterly,51,375-378。  new window
31.Nathan, M.(2015)。A Simulacrum Account of Dispositional Properties。Noûs,49(2),253-274。  new window
圖書
1.Stanley, Jason(2011)。Know How。Oxford:Oxford University Press。  new window
2.Ryle, Gilbert(1949)。The Concept of Mind。University of Chicago Press。  new window
3.Mumford, Stephen(1998)。Dispositions。Oxford University Press。  new window
4.Löwenstein, D.(2017)。Know-How as Competence: A Rylean Responsibilist Account。Vittorio Klostermann。  new window
圖書論文
1.Glick, E.(2012)。Abilities and Know-How Attributions。Knowledge Ascriptions。Oxford University Press。  new window
 
 
 
 
第一頁 上一頁 下一頁 最後一頁 top
QR Code
QRCODE