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題名:反例式哲學實驗:模態語意、理解規範與一個常態性理論
書刊名:歐美研究
作者:侯維之 引用關係
作者(外文):Hou, Richard Wei-tzu
出版日期:2023
卷期:53:3
頁次:頁381-434
主題關鍵詞:反例式哲學實驗反例式哲學思想實驗異常體現知態規範性常態性Counterexample philosophical experimentCounterexample philosophical thought experimentDeviant realizationEpistemic normativityNormalcy
原始連結:連回原系統網址new window
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  • 被引用次數被引用次數:期刊(0) 博士論文(0) 專書(0) 專書論文(0)
  • 排除自我引用排除自我引用:0
  • 共同引用共同引用:4
  • 點閱點閱:0
期刊論文
1.王文方、王一奇(20080300)。我們需要一個有關於條件句的統一新理論。歐美研究,38(1),65-102。new window  延伸查詢new window
2.Weinberg, J. M.、Gonnerman, C.、Buckner, C.、Alexander, J.(2010)。Are Philosophers Expert Intuiters?。Philosophical Psychology,23(3),331-355。  new window
3.Adams, E. W.(1970)。Subjunctive and Indicative Conditionals。Foundations of Language,6(1),89-94。  new window
4.Grundmann, Thomas、Horvath, Joachim(2014)。Thought experiments and the problem of deviant realizations。Philosophical Studies,170(3),525-533。  new window
5.Ichikawa, Jonathan、Jarvis, Benjamin(2009)。Thought-experiment intuitions and truth in fiction。Philosophical Studies,142(2),221-246。  new window
6.Williamson, Timothy(2009)。Replies to Ichikawa, Martin and Weinberg。Philosophical Studies,145(3),465-476。  new window
7.Gettier, Edmund L.(1963)。Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?。Analysis,23(6),121-123。  new window
8.Gardiner, G.(2015)。Normalcy and the Contents of Philosophical Judgements。Inquiry,58(7/8),700-740。  new window
9.Geddes, A.(2018)。Judgements about Thought Experiments。Mind,127(505),35-67。  new window
10.Ichikawa, J.、Jarvis, B.(2012)。Rational Imagination and Modal Knowledge。Noûs,46(1),127-158。  new window
11.Malmgren, Anna-Sara(2011)。Rationalism and the Content of Intuitive Judgements。Mind,120(478),265-327。  new window
12.Weinberg, J. M.、Nichols, S.、Stich, S.(2001)。Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions。Philosophical Topics,29(1/2),429-460。  new window
13.Williamson, T.(2011)。Philosophical Expertise and the Burden of Proof。Metaphilosophy,42(3),215-229。  new window
14.侯維之(20200800)。哲學思想實驗語意進路的後設思考。哲學與文化,47(8)=555,59-76。new window  延伸查詢new window
15.Brown, J.(2013)。Intuitions, evidence and hopefulness。Synthese,190(12),2021-2046。  new window
16.Deutsch, M.(2010)。Intuitions, counter-examples, and experimental philosophy。Review of Philosophy and Psychology,1(3),447-460。  new window
17.Ichikawa, J.(2012)。Experimentalist pressure against traditional methodology。Philosophical Psychology,25(5),743-765。  new window
18.Lehrer, K.(1965)。Knowledge, truth and evidence。Analysis,25(5),168-175。  new window
19.Lehrer, K.、Paxson, T. Jr.(1969)。Knowledge: Undefeated justified true belief。The Journal of Philosophy,66(8),225-237。  new window
20.Leitgeb, H.(2012)。A probabilistic semantics for counterfactuals。The Review of Symbolic Logic,5(1),26-84。  new window
21.Leitgeb, H.(2012)。A probabilistic semantics for counterfactuals。The Review of Symbolic Logic,5(1),85-121。  new window
22.Praëm, S. K.、Steglich-Petersen, A.(2015)。Philosophical thought experiments as heuristics for theory discovery。Synthese,192(9),2827-2842。  new window
23.Smith, M.(2007)。Ceteris paribus conditionals and comparative normalcy。Journal of Philosophical Logic,36(1),97-121。  new window
24.Weinberg, J. M.(2007)。How to challenge intuitions empirically without risking skepticism。Midwest Studies in Philosophy,31(1),318-343。  new window
25.Clark, Michael(1963)。Knowledge and Grounds: A Comment on Mr. Gettier’s Paper。Analysis,24(2),46-48。  new window
圖書
1.Lewis, D.(1973)。Counterfactuals。Blackwell。  new window
2.Chalmers, D. J.(1996)。The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory。Oxford University Press。  new window
3.Armstrong, D. M.(1973)。Belief, Truth and Knowledge。Cambridge University Press。  new window
4.Williamson, Timothy(2007)。The Philosophy of Philosophy。Wiley-Blackwell。  new window
5.Kahneman, D.(2011)。Thinking, Fast and Slow。Farrar, Straus and Giroux。  new window
圖書論文
1.Gerken, M.(2015)。Philosophical insights and modal cognition。Experimental philosophy, rationalism, and naturalism。Routledge。  new window
 
 
 
 
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