許多寡佔競爭問題:可歸類為「兩階段重複性賽局」本文將此種賽局的 基本性質、特徵和結構予以標準化:並且提出對應於此一賽局的「Folk定理」本文 並且將理論應用在「產能限制下的重複性價格競爭」，以及「重複性價格競爭與 區位選擇」這兩項問題之上。

　　　　　Many competitive situations can be modelled as a two-stage repeated game. This paper is the first attempt at such a modelling.We introduce the concept of the two-stage minmax payoff. Ourmain result is the following "folk theorem": if players are sufficiently patient, then any feasible payoff vector in the second stageof a stage game is a subgame perfect equilibrium payoff of the corresponding two-stage repeated game if and only if the feasible payoffvector dominates the two-stage minimax payoff. The paper thenapplies the theory to analyze problems arising when the firms engage in repeated price competition with capacities and locationsconstrained.