In the last ten years, while environment protection became an important international issue gradually, the nature of trade measure as the tool for environment protection has become more obvious in the meantime. Not only there are trade clauses being enacted into the international agreements so as to encourage every country's participation, but also individual state adopted trade measures to resolve its domestic environment problems. As to the United States, it is a fixing pattern for the States to use trade measure to promote and enhance its tradeing partners' environmental standard regarding the enviroment problems. Among them, Pelly Amendment is the most notable environmental trade measure, which restricts on importation of any product from countries which violate international fishery or endangered or threatened species programs. This article discusses the U.S. Pelly Amendment in detail at first, including its legislature brief, legal provision and its practice. Then, it focuses on the U.S. trade sanction against Taiwan, R.O.C. according to the Pelly Amendment in 1994. As a case study, this article challenges the soundness and legitimacy of U.S. unilateral trade sanction under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) , i.e. Art.I (most-favored nation treatment), Art.Ⅲ (national treatment) and Art.XX (exceptions to Art. I & Art.Ⅲ) and the GATT Dispute Settlement Panel's decisions, such as those of U.S. restrictions on Imports of Tuna and Thailand's restrictions on importation and internal taxes on cigarette, etc.. Generally speaking, the U.S. Pelly Amendment seems to contradict Art.Ⅲ of GATT, since it broadens its import restriction application scope to “any” product (i.e. to adopt the production process standard) but not the “like” product. The focus of the Art.Ⅲ obligation for national treatment is based on offering identical regulation for “like” products, implying a focus on the product itself, and not on the production process. It also doesn't fall into the exceptions provided by Art.XX of GATT because of its extrajurisdictional nature. In addition, there is not much persuation that the U.S. unilateral trade sanctions against Taiwan, R.O.C. is “necessary” to achieve its desired goal. Finally, this article tries to make some suggestions for our government to effectively response to the U.S. trade sanctions, e.g. to offer plans to help our manufacturers concerned, to strike for termination of such trade sanctions by U.S. review procedure and to make efforts to accede the World Trode Organization (WTO), in order to properly utilize the strengthend dispute settlement mechanism compared with the GATT, to ask for multilateral relief.