八十年代中期以來，大陸的鄉鎮企業藉經濟改革之勢，取得了長足的發展。為了謀 求效益，這類企業之中有相當一批轉由承包人管理。承包企業的利潤在承包人和大陸的中央 政府、鄉政府、本企業及企業職工之間進行分配。接受調查的十一個盈利的鄉鎮企業，其承 包人為了最大限度地謀取自我利益，全部採用了削弱中央政府利益的越軌策略。然而，由於 能夠得到鄉鎮政府的支持，這種越軌實踐已經變得半制度化。本文採用主觀性合理選擇模式 ，去探討在席捲大陸的經濟變革時期，結構性與能動性這兩類條件如何運作而導致了此類越 軌行為的產生。

　　　　　As a partial result of Mainland China's current economic reform town-level collective enterprises have undergone rapid expansion since mid-1980s; a large number of them have been put to contract for more efficient management. The profits generated by these enterprises are subject to division between the contractors and the mainland central government, the township governments, the enterprises, and the workers. the contractors of all the enterprises under study that produced a profit were found to employ deviant strategies to maximize their shares at the cost of the state. However, with the support of township governments, their deviant practice could be semi-institutionalized. A rational choice model is used to identify the structural and agentic cnditions which operated to bring about the emergence of this deviant behavior pattern during a period of radical society-wise economic transition.