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題名:營建業組織中代理問題之分析
書刊名:建築學報
作者:王明德張登傑
作者(外文):Wang, Ming-tethChang, Teng-chieh
出版日期:1999
卷期:30
頁次:頁27-42
主題關鍵詞:代理問題資訊不對稱目標衝突Agent problemsInformation asymmetryConflict of interests
原始連結:連回原系統網址new window
相關次數:
  • 被引用次數被引用次數:期刊(3) 博士論文(0) 專書(0) 專書論文(0)
  • 排除自我引用排除自我引用:2
  • 共同引用共同引用:0
  • 點閱點閱:38
     營建工程的生產過程參與者眾,以傳統的工程採購方式而言,生產團隊中的業主 、建築師與承包商構成最主要的三角關係,建築師負責工程設計,承包商則負責工程施工。 從經濟學的角度觀之,業主為主理人,建築師與承包商可視為業主的代理人,由於業主與代 理人之間存在資訊不對稱以及目標衝突,所以產生代理問題,如建築師過度設計、承包商偷 工減料等。本文以業主的角度探討傳統工程採購方式可能會產生的代理問題,應用經濟學中 的代理理論為基礎,研究代理問題的本質、存在原因與影響,提供業主於推動工程時做一參 考。
     Many parties are involved through the planning, design, and construction phases to accomplish a construction project. The organizational relationship among owner, architect/engineer, and contractors plays an important role during project delivery. Due to asymmetric information and interest conflict between principals and agents, agents may take actions that could violate the interests of principals. Such actions include architect/engineer's offering an over- designed plan for increasing his own compensation, contractor's shirking in delivering disqualified projects. To help owners understand agent problems in construction organization and successfully deliver projects, this paper identifies the agent problems that frequently occru in the process of design and construction. Based on owner's viewpoint. The study applies agent theory to analyze the characteristics, causes, and effects of agent problems in construction organization.
期刊論文
1.王泰昌、鄭博文(19930600)。反覆推陳 必得其所--代理問題與代理成本。會計研究月刊,93,155-160。  延伸查詢new window
2.王泰昌、鄭博文(19930700)。反覆推陳 必得其所--代理問題與代理成本。會計研究月刊,94,123-126。  延伸查詢new window
3.Eisenhardt, Kathleen M.(1989)。Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review。The Academy of Management Review,14(1),57-74。  new window
4.Ross, Stephen A.(1973)。The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem。The American Economic Review,63(2),134-139。  new window
5.Jensen, Michael C.、Meckling, William H.(1976)。Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure。Journal of Financial Economics,3(4),305-360。  new window
6.蔡阿媚(1990)。代理理論在最適股權結構決定應用上之研究。臺南女院學報,9,91-154。  延伸查詢new window
7.McCormick, Robert E.、Bell, Lansford C.、Howard, William E.(1997)。Economic Principles of Contractor Compensation。Journal of Management in Engineering,Sept/ Oct,81-89。  new window
學位論文
1.張倩瑜(1994)。我國營造市場經濟行為之研究,0。  延伸查詢new window
2.廖佳雯(1997)。營建業上市公司代理問題之初步探討,0。  延伸查詢new window
3.廖修三(1971)。民法上代理制度之比較研究,0。  延伸查詢new window
4.陳台霖(1993)。代理理論觀下銀行受信之群體決策輔助系統,0。  延伸查詢new window
圖書
1.李乃鼎(1978)。民法概論。民法概論。沒有紀錄。  延伸查詢new window
2.Schmidt, R. H.(1987)。Agency costs are not a 'Flop'。Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives。沒有紀錄。  new window
3.Dessler, Gary(1977)。Organization and Management。Organization and Management。臺北。  new window
4.Hillier, Brian(1996)。The Economics of Asymmetric Information。The Economics of Asymmetric Information。沒有紀錄。  new window
 
 
 
 
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