戴震以一代考據大師，卻是一系列矢志重建義理學的清儒中，首先站出來大力撻伐宋明理學的學者。他認為流行了五、六百年的理學「存理滅欲」模式，根本不合人情；而一種不合人情的思想，怎麼能夠指導現實社會中充滿了人欲的百姓日用思想？所以他另外提出能夠真正落實在經驗領域中的「通情遂欲」新價值觀。本文就是以戴震所建構的、具有重智主義傾向的新義理思想，做為主要的探察對象。全文首先對戴震重建義理學的背景做一探討，以為其建構新義理學的外緣觀察。其次便對戴震的義理思想分就〞本體論〞－－落在經驗領域的道論：〞人性論〞－－從踐履結果說的性善論；以及循客觀途徑以達的〞功夫論〞－－「以學養智」的重智主義強調、「以情絜情」的恕道推擴運用等方面做逐一的析論。最後復就其「歸於必然，適完其自然」的道德踐履觀做一檢視、並提出其義理猶有斷層的難題所在。 　　透過這樣的一種新道德觀建立，戴震推翻了理學家「知識與性體不相干」的道德、知識二元論，另外提出「德性資於學問」的新命題；也打破了理學家內向自足的存養省察、默坐澄心、無欲則靜等功夫，將道德觸角伸向經驗世界，使得性體與現實緊密結合－而這也就是清儒想要針對理學末流〞天崩地解，落然無與吾事〞之脫離現實所做的修正。於是乎清儒的道德觀，在戴震以及其後的一系列學者，諸如淩廷堪、焦循、阮元的努力之下，遂蛻變成為必須落在現實社會中用功夫、必須經由客觀實踐才能實現的道德理性了。

　　　　　Among many Quing Confucians who attempt to rebuild rationalism, Dai Chen, a master of textual research, is the first scholar to severely criticize the Sung Ming Dynasties' Rational Principle. He believes that this rational principle, which suppresses human desires and emotions, does not conform with humanity. He doubts how such principle and philosophy is able to guide people's daily life and behavior. As a result, he proposes a new form of intellectualism-based morality that satisfies desires and conforms with humanity, and can be carried out experimentally. Dai Chen's new rationalism aims to a apply tao (guiding discourse) in the empirical domain, to cultivate heart-mind virtue, and to develop moral character in shu (altruism). This altruistic way of thinking emphasizes on knowledge and is best manifested in the Confucian rules such as: "use knowledge to train the intellect" (以學養智) and "Do not do to others what you do not want done to yourself." The development of morality and rationality for a long time used to be in an inner, self-sustained and metaphysical form. However with the new rationalism, morality can now only be developed and put into effect through experiences in the real world. Thus moral cultivation is no longer a slogan and empty talk that is out of touch with reality or daily life.