It had been held for decades by the U.S. Supreme Court that agreements between manufacturers and distributors fixing the maximum resale price levels were per se illegal under the Sherman Act. The Court relinquished such a view in State Oil v. Kahn of 1997 and declared in that case that maximum resale price maintenance would be reviewed under the rule-of-reason standard. State Oil reveals a trend under which the Court gradually departs itself from basing antitrust decisions primarily on the mechanical application of established legal doctrines such as the freedom to determine one's own prices. Instead, functional analysis in the sense that the legality of maximum resale price maintenance be determined by an evaluation of its potential market impacts would now be relied upon more favorably by the Court in trials. Not only will this change of reviewing standard be meaningful for antitrust practitioners, it also represents a reconsideration from the Court regarding antitrust regulators' quite critical view on any price agreement among market participants. This article intends to present a detailed introduction and analysis of this issue from both economic and legal points of view. With respect to economic theories, I focus on how procompetitively maximum resale price maintenance could be used to resolve the "successive monopoly" problem and how, according to the Supreme Court, it could be abused to facilitate collusion. In light of legal theories, I will first offer a historical account of how the per se rule was applied to cases concerning maximum resale price maintenance, in particular the Albrecht rule, followed by a analysis of the lower courts' modification of the reasoning in Albrecht developed to accommodate the rising criticisms of that case. In addition, the Court' s holdings in State Oil will be introduced in this part. I conclude this article with a discussion on how American experience could shed light on the enforcement of Article 18 of the Fair Trade Law in Taiwan.