本文以開發支出會計政策隱性選擇為切入點來觀察研究控股股東股權質押對公司會計政策選擇的影響及其動態變化。我們基于我國上市公司2007-2015年間的相關數據研究發現,控股股東股權質押的公司更傾向于將開發支出資本化以進行正向盈余管理,但公司內部現金流約束和高質量外部審計監督會對此有所抑制。我們進一步研究發現,隨著控股股東股權質押的解除,開發支出資本化也很可能隨之轉為費用化,控股股東對開發支出會計政策的選擇存在動態調整。此外,我們還發現,控股股東股權質押與開發支出會計政策隱性選擇之間的正相關關系主要出現在非國有控股公司和高新技術公司中。

The paper investigate the static and dynamic effects of controlling shareholder’s share pledging on the implicit choice of development cost accounting policy based on the data of listed firms of 2007-2015.After controlling for other factors,we find that:Compared with the firms whose controlling shareholder do not have share pledging,firms whose controlling shareholder has share pledging are more inclined to capitalize the development cost.However,the internal cash flow constraints and external auditing with high quality will weaken this relation.Further,we document that,with the termination of the controlling shareholder’s share pledging,firms would be probable to change the development cost accounting policy from capitalization method to expensing method,which is a kind of dynamic effect of controlling shareholder’s share pledging on development cost accounting policy choice.In addition,we also find that the positive relation mainly emerges in the high technology firms and non-state owned enterprises.