本文實證檢驗了中國獨特的半強制分紅政策對有再融資動機的上市公司分紅行為的影響,并進一步考察了半強制分紅政策背景下股利代理理論和信號理論這兩種經典股利理論的解釋力。研究發現:(1)半強制分紅政策顯著提高了有再融資動機的上市公司的派現意愿和派現水平;(2)上市公司派現可以有效降低兩類代理成本,而現金股利變動(尤其是現金股利增加)則可以有效傳遞公司未來盈利變動的信號;(3)相比而言,有再融資動機的上市公司通過派現降低兩類代理成本、發送股利信號的作用顯著更弱。可見,雖然股利代理理論和信號理論總體上能夠解釋中國上市公司分紅行為,但在半強制分紅政策背景下,有再融資動機的上市公司分紅行為受到了明顯干預,這使得兩種經典股利理論的解釋力有所削弱。

This paper empirically tests the effects of the Semi-mandatory Dividend Rules("the Rules")on dividend policy of Chinese listed firms which have refinancing motivation and the explanatory power of classical agency theory and signaling theory.We show that(1)the Rules significantly enhance the cash dividend payout propensity and ratio of listed firms with refinancing motivation;(2)the distribution of cash dividends can effectively reduce the shareholdermanagement and controlling-minority shareholders agency costs,and the change(especially the increase)of cash dividends can convey the information of the future profit change;and(3)relatively speaking,the effects of cash dividends that alleviating two types of agency problems and sending signaling are significantly weaker in listed firms with refinancing motivation.In conclusion,the agency theory and signaling theory can explain Chinese listed firms’dividend behaviors;however,the Rules change the dividend policy of listed firms with refinancing motivation and weaken the explanatory power of both theories.