本文審視了聶敏里《意志的缺席——對古典希臘道德心理學的批評》一文中提出的幾個基本觀點,即古希臘意志概念的缺席、康德意志概念的優越性、行為之道德屬性應歸責于意志以及賴爾對意志概念的消解之無效性,并對其各自做了回應。通過進一步的分析和考量,本文提出如下觀點:(一)與狄勒"古希臘無意志"一說中所發現的、在古希臘哲學中缺席的意志概念,對應的是康德的自由抉擇(Willkür)概念,而非其意志(Wille)概念——康德將道德的善惡歸責于自由抉擇,而非作為實踐理性的意志;(二)康德也認識到了賴爾所批評的身心間因果作用的問題,而重視賴爾所提出的問題,有助于進一步理解康德將意志限制到道德領域的做法。

This article provide an analysis and comments on Prof. Nie Minli’s article"The Absence of the Concept of Will: A Critique of Classical Greek Moral Psychology. "Based on Nie’s argumentation,it examines his major claims,i. e. concerning the absence of will in classical Greek philosophy and the superiority of Kant’s concept of will,how the moral quality of man’s actions should be attributed to the will,and how Ryle’s destruction of the concept of will is illegitimate. As an answer to Nie’s statement,this article argues that what is diagnosed as absent in ancient Greece by Dihle corresponds to the notion of Willkür in Kant rather than the notion of will.Kant attributes the goodness or badness of actions to Willkür,but not to the Wille. Kant faces also the problem of the causal relationship between mind and body,as pointed out by Ryle; therefore,instead of taking Ryle as an antagonist,the problems revealed by him help us understand why Kant restrict the influence of will to the realm of morality.