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題名：規定審計公費下限之研究
作者：許恩得 引用關係
作者(外文)：Ente Hsu
校院名稱：國立臺灣大學
系所名稱：會計學研究所
指導教授：王泰昌
學位類別：博士
出版日期：2004
主題關鍵詞：訊息傳遞賽局；審計品質；市場競爭賽局；審計公費下限；強制簽證；compulsory attestation；market competition game；information signaling model；audit quality；audit fee floor
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審計公費下限指政府管制會計師簽證酬金不得低於特定的水準。本論文是首篇探討規定審計公費下限之分析性文獻。除了發展審計公費下限之理論，本論文亦探討審計公費水準的決定因素，解釋實證研究在審計公費特性缺乏一致性結論的原因，分別以市場競爭與訊息傳遞模型探討規定審計公費下限與審計品質之關係，並分析審計公費下限對審計市場與社會福利之影響，最後建議審計公費下限的實施方式。雖然目前規定審計公費下限的案例尚不多見，但是本論文發現在特定條件下該制度有助於提升會計師的簽證品質及公司財務資訊的可靠性。
本論文的內容主要包括四部分：首先，本論文透過市場競爭賽局分析審計市場之均衡，將審計市場區分為不同的類型，並分析審計公費水準之影響因素。本論文發現不同的審計市場類型，其審計公費之水準不同。藉由審計公費水準影響因素之變化，本論文進一步解釋審計市場實證研究出現下列結論的原因：（一）審計市場不一定出現低價競爭；（二）審計品質與審計公費不一定正相關；（三）不同國家的審計公費水準出現明顯差異；與（四）同一國家審計公費水準之變化與其經濟發展或消費水準不一定正相關。
其次，本論文分析在未強制簽證之證券交易市場，政府規定審計公費下限的可能影響。結果發現政府若在不同審計市場類型訂定不同水準的審計公費下限，將對審計品質、審計效率及社會福利產生不同的影響。此結論具有下列弁遄G（一）協助政府判斷適合實施審計公費下限之審計市場類型；（二）提供政府決定審計公費下限的水準；與（三）解釋各國政府未普遍規定審計公費下限之原因。
第三，本論文分析在強制簽證之證券交易市場，政府規定審計公費下限的可能影響。結果發現政府若只實施審計公費下限，則無法確保會計師提升審計品質；政府若將審計公費與法律責任結合，並搭配相關措施，則規定審計公費下限對審計品質、審計效率及社會福利有正面的影響。
最後，本論文運用訊息傳遞賽局分析在強制簽證的證券發行市場，政府規定審計公費下限與審計品質的關係。結果也發現在審計公費與法律責任結合之後，政府規定審計公費下限將提升會計師之審計品質。
Audit fee floor typically refers to a government-imposed restriction on CPA attestation fee that must not below a particular level. This dissertation is the first article to study audit fee floor regulation in the analytical audit literatures. While trying to establish a theory on regulating audit fee floor, I examine the determinants of audit fee level, and explain why some characteristics of audit fee engender inconsistent conclusions in empirical research evidences. I also use both market competition and information signaling games to analyze the relationships between regulating audit fee floor and the audit quality respectively. Then I analyze the possible effects of regulating audit fee floor on audit market and social welfare, and I also suggest some related mechanisms if governments try to implement this proposed policy. Although regulating audit fee floor is not implemented in the other nations at the present time, in this dissertation I show that this regulation will be able to promote CPA’s audit quality and to raise credibility of corporate financial information under some particular conditions.
This dissertation includes the following four parts: First, I use a market competition game to analyze the audit market equilibriums, and then classified audit markets into some different types. I also study the determinants of audit fee level. I find that different audit market types will possess different audit fee levels. By observing the variety in determinants of audit fee level, I further explain the possible causes for the following phenomena of the audit markets. The empirical research could not prove that low balling does appear in audit market, or audit quality and audit fee have a positive relationship. Moreover, some audit literatures discovered that different nations incur different audit fee levels. Finally, audit fees do change over time, but it is not related to economic development or consumption level.
In the second part of this dissertation, I analyze the possible economic effects of regulating audit fee floor in a securities transaction market without compulsory attestation regulation. I conclude that it will induce different influences on audit quality, audit efficiency and social welfares if government regulates audit fee floor at different levels in different audit market types. This conclusion will be useful for government to regulate audit fee floor in the following situations. (1) It is helpful for government to choose a proper audit market type to regulate audit fee floor. (2) It provides government to decide a proper audit fee floor level. (3) It explains why audit fee floor was not implemented in all countries.
In the third part of this dissertation, I prove that we are unable to guarantee CPA’s audit quality if government regulates audit fee floor alone in a securities transaction market with compulsory attestation regulation. Only when government combines audit fee with legal liabilities and some related measures, then there is positive effect for regulating audit fee floor on audit quality, audit efficiency and social welfares.
In the final part of this dissertation, I use an information signaling model to analyze the relatiohship between regulating audit fee floor and audit quality in a securities issue market under compulsory attestation regulation. I also prove that there is positive effect for regulating audit fee floor on audit quality if government combines audit fee with legal liabilities.
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