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題名：禁止迴轉資產減損損失後利用處分資產方式之盈餘管理行為：中國證據
作者：黃朝信 引用關係
作者(外文)：Chao-Hsin Huang
校院名稱：國立臺灣大學
系所名稱：會計學研究所
指導教授：杜榮瑞
學位類別：博士
出版日期：2013
主題關鍵詞：資產減損；處分資產；盈餘管理；Asset impairment；Asset sales；Earnings management
原始連結：連回原系統網址new window
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當公司認列資產減損損失，會以資產減損準備（累計減損）降低資產之帳面價值，在會計準則允許迴轉減損損失時，資產減損準備扮演餅乾罐的角色，公司經理人能夠藉以進行盈餘管理。如果會計準則禁止迴轉減損損失，經理人仍然能夠透過處分資產方式以實現以前年度多提列的減損損失。鑑於中國上市公司的經理人濫用資產減損迴轉進行盈餘管理，2007年起開始適用的會計準則禁止迴轉長期資產減損損失。本文利用中國會計準則之變遷，檢視資產減損準備之餅乾罐角色，在禁止迴轉減損損失時是否仍被經理人運用而進行盈餘管理。同時，本文探討良好的公司治理機制是否能夠抑制經理人利用資產減損準備從事盈餘管理行為。
本文以2003年至2009年中國上市公司A股的資料利用迴歸模式，分析準則改變前後公司之處分資產淨利益。過去研究指出公司從事資產減損的認列與迴轉包括有經濟因素或盈餘管理二種目的，本文以排除一般經濟因素的超常減損準備，來說明資產減損準備對經理人行為之影響。再者，中國上市公司若連續兩期虧損，證券交易所會警示公司的財務狀況不良，因此前一期虧損的公司其經理人將具有動機提高本期盈餘以避免虧損。
實證結果發現以前年度曾經迴轉資產減損損失的公司，相較於準則改變前，前一期虧損且超常減損準備較高的公司在準則改變後其處分資產淨利益較高。顯示準則改變前曾經迴轉減損損失的公司，在禁止迴轉減損損失後雖然失去一項便捷的盈餘管理工具，仍可利用資產減損準備的餅乾罐角色，以處分資產方式達到盈餘管理的需求。
本文探討公司治理機制抑制盈餘管理行為的效果，實證結果顯示前一期虧損的公司，若處在較高的超常減損準備及較差的公司治理程度時，在準則改變後會採取處分資產以進行盈餘管理。研究同時發現以股權結構所扮演的外部監督力量較具抑制盈餘管理行為的效果。本文的研究結果可供主管機關與專業團體作為政策與準則制定之參考。
Firms that experience asset impairment generate a reverse account to determine the extent of impairment. If the accounting standards permit the reversing of a previously recognized impairment loss, this reversal provides an opportunity for earnings management. In this case, the impairment losses serve as a “cookie jar.” However, if the accounting standards prohibit the reversing of an impairment loss, managers can still utilize this cookie jar reversal with the subsequent sale and disposal of the impaired assets.
The listed firms in China have abused the provision for the reversal of impairment losses to manage earnings. Thus, the Chinese government announced a new accounting standard—with effect from the reporting periods beginning on or after January 1, 2007—that prohibits the reversal of long-term asset impairments to limit the opportunistic reporting by managers following asset impairment recognition and reversal. This new standard gives an opportunity to examine whether managers would dispose of impaired assets to manipulate earnings based on overestimated asset impairments. Additionally, I also examine whether a corporate governance mechanism can mitigate this opportunistic behavior.
Data were selected from China’s listed A shares between 2003 and 2009. The income from sales of assets before and after the change of this accounting standard is analyzed using the regression method. The abnormal accumulated impairment, which excludes the normal write-downs under the economic factors, is calculated in order to differentiate between managers’ opportunistic behaviors. Since the stock exchanges in China label firms in financial trouble as special treatment firms if they have a negative net income for two consecutive years, managers have an incentive to report a profit when their firm has reported losses in the prior year.
The results show that firms that previously reported losses with higher abnormal accumulated impairments have a higher income from the sale of assets in the periods when accounting standards prohibit the reversal of impairments than in the periods when accounting standards permit the reversal. Specifically, firms that reversed impairment losses to manage earnings could still utilize the overestimated asset impairment by disposing of the impaired asset. The empirical findings also show that firms that previously reported losses with higher abnormal accumulated impairments and less corporate governance have a higher income from the sale of assets after the prohibition of the reversals. Further analysis finds that a mitigating effect comes from the shareholder structure. These findings could provide insights into policies for regulators and accounting standard setters.
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