After the Nation Government established a capital in Nanjing, its ruling was not stable and often faced the challenges from local warlords. Chiang Kai-shek, the leader of the Nationalist government, was deeply concerned about the serious issues of how to effectively practice and strengthen the “centralization” and to enhance the control of the local governments. Between the end of the Northern Expedition and the Central Plains War, Chiang tried to centralize mainly by military force. After the Central Plains War, Chiang, who had realized that people were tired of turmoil, had a different idea about the process of centralization. He thought that the priority was to promote the political reform, to start democracy, and to promote the peaceful unification through the holding of the National Assembly and the formulating of the Provisional Constitution.
Chiang’s practice of “centralization” in Sichuan Province went through some adjustments. At first, Chiang treated Sichuan Province with the idea of the Jimi system. The concrete practice was to nominally allow Liu Xiang and Liu Wen-hui to control the military power separately. But neither of them were satisfied with the situation at that time. Both of them tried to dominate Sichuan Province alone, and the war between them was inevitable. At the beginning of the war, Chiang aggressively tried to negotiate peace between the two Liu’s. But the central government was not powerful enough to stop the war, and Chiang could just wait for the outcome. Finally, Liu Xiang won the victory, and Liu Wen-hui went back to Sikang. The war in Sichuan temporarily came to an end. Sichuan was officially dominated by Liu-Xiang.
Although Liu Xiang dominated the situation in Sichuan, he suffered from major failure in the communist suppression. He couldn’t help but agree the Nationalist government to send a military staff committee to Sichuan to help the communist suppression. In 1935, Chiang even went to Sichuan in person to inspect the communist suppression and the administration of the Sichuan government. During Chiang’s stay in Sichuan, he coordinated the armies to suppress the communists, planned the road construction, asked the armies to downsize, whipped the finance into shape, held E-Mei Officers Training Regiment, and constructed Sichuan as the base for the war against Japan. These important measures set up good foundations for the centralization of Sichuan. But after the central power reached Sichuan, there was much friction between the central government and Liu Xiang. The Guangdong-Guangxi Incident and the Xian Incident made it clear that Liu Xiang was trying to fight against the central government. After considering thoroughly, Chiang decided to resolve the problem in Sichuan with political measures and asked Ho Ying-chin to consolidate the armies in Sichuan. During the meeting, the Lugou Bridge Incident happened suddenly, and Ho Ying-Chin ended the meeting in a rush and went back to Nanjing. The reorganization of the armies in Sichuan was not put into effect.
After the war against Japan erupted, the armies in Sichuan aggressively supported the central government to fight against Japan. In January, 1938, Liu Xiang died of disease in Hankou. To thoroughly eradicate the local power in Sichuan, Chiang was determined to appoint Chang Chun to succeed the provincial chairman of Sichuan. However, the appointment led to the objection from the Sichuan armies. Chiang couldn’t help but change his decision. He appointed Deng Xi-hou as the pacification commissioner at Sichuan and Sikan and Wang Zuan-xu as the provincial chairman. In 1939, 7 divisional commanders stood out against Wang Zuan-xu in Sichuan. Chiang failed to coordinate and decided to be the provincial chairman of Sichuan himself. Afterwards, because of Chiang’s plan and arrangement, the armies in Sichuan finally accepted Chang Chun as the provincial chairman. This represented the advance of the centralization in Sichuan.
Toward the end of the war against Japan, Chiang implemented kid-gloves policy for Sichuan armies in the hope that the local armies would understood that the central government was trying to be kind to them and then be loyal to the central government. In fact, the split was still evident in the line-up for Sichuan armies. Deng Xi-hou, Pan Wen-hua, and Liu Wen-hua had their own territory. Sometimes they cooperated with the Nationalist government, and at other times they fight against it. The Nationalist government’s passive act in Sichuan during the eight years put the “centralization” of Sichuan in a tight pot. After the war against Japan ended, the Nationalist government reorganized the armies and set up the Field Headquarters in Chongqing. Chang Chun was appointed the commissioner, whose job was to coordinate the armies in Southwest China firstly and to plan the construction secondly. But The Chinese Civil War was getting more and more intensely. The construction in Sichuan was out of the government’s depth.
In the beginning of the year 1949, the situation of the Chinese Civil War was reversed, and Chiang was forced to resign. Before Chiang resigned, he appointed Chang Chun as the pacification commissioner at Chongqing. Shortly after Chang Chun was inaugurated, Rumor had it in Sichuan that he couldn’t get along with Yang Sen and Wang Ling-chi. Moreover, Liu Wen-hui, Deng Xi-hou, and Pan Wen-hua were linking up against provincial chairman Wang Ling-Chi. The situation in Sichuan seemed volatile. In April, massive communist troops crossed the Yanzi River, and the Nationalist government set up the Southeast Military and Political Executive Office, which coordinated the defensive affairs in southwest China, and Chang Chun was appointed the executive officer. Afterwards, Chiang Kai-shek was busy dealing with the political struggle with Li Tsung-jen and preparing for Taiwan’s military affairs. Chiang was not able to stop the political chaos and could just sit by. Shortly before the Communist army attacked Southwest China, Chiang went to Sichuan twice in the second half of the year 1949 with the priority of settling the disputes there. But Chiang’s flexible persuasion was in vain. The communist army “liberated” Sichuan in less than 2 months. The Nationalist government was at its wit’s end with the political infighting among the establishment figures in Sichuan and helplessly waited for the failure of the military action. This meant that the “centralization” policy in Sichuan needed revising.
The “centralization” promoted by Chiang in Sichuan focused on consolidating the armies. The three-time consolidations were conducted by local military generals. The central government did nothing more than inspecting afterwards. The effect of it was dubious. Chiang gave more freedom to the generals in Sichuan, so they had the chance to keep their power. Therefore, some of the armies chose to stand on the communists’ side during the Chinese Civil War. To the Nationalist government, the most “centralized” armies in Sichuan were the generals Wang Ling-chi, Sun Zhen, Tang Shizun, etc. All of them were assigned to fight in Sichuan during the war against Japan, and they were all convinced of nationalism. Therefore, they could be loyal to the Nationalist government in the Chinese Civil War. Judging from this, to achieve military “centralization” successfully in the nation, the local troops had to be moved to other provinces and their ties with the original local power should be cut. Only by doing so would the “centralization” policy work effectively.