本研究以實證檢視圍內上市公司在現金增資的不同階段（股東大會決議日與繳款日），是否有不同的盈餘管理行為，暨諸如資本結構、經營與所有權集中度等企業特性，及現金增資用途，是否影響盈餘管理的操控幅度。在分析過程中，本文亦使用將現金增資視為內生變數的聯立Jones模式，重新檢測盈餘管理行為。研究結果發現：（1）公司管理當局在增資繳款日當季，顯著增加裁決性應計盈餘，然至下一季裁決性應計盈餘顯著回轉；裁決性應計項目於股東大會當季，尚未出現正向變動，此結果與管理當局操縱繳款日當季盈餘，以配合企業為促成中籤投資人繳款所釋放利多消息的假說相符。而裁決性應計盈餘於次季立即回轉，相較於並未檢測出增資後出現回轉的國外相關研究，比較能反映企業盈餘操控的顯著性.（2）負債比率較高或經營與所有權合一者，在 增資繳款日當期操控裁決性應計盈餘的幅度，大於負債比率較低或經營與所有權較分散者，在統計上達邊際顯著水準，（3）現金增資用途為償還債務的公 司，在增資繳款日當期操控裁決性應計盈餘幅度，大於增資擴廠者，在統計上達到邊際顯著水準，（4）使用聯立modified Jones model重新檢測，結果仍然支 持盈餘管理假說，且將現金增資視為內生而非外生變數時，分析結果更形顯著。

　　This study empirically explores the significance of earnings management accompanying seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) by companies listed on Taiwan Stock Exchange. Specifically, we examine discretionary accruals (DAs) for the quarters of shareholders' meetings and subscription payments for the SEOs. We also study whether and how DAs vary with capital structure, concentration of shareholdings and the objective of SEOs. Our test results suggest that (1) prior quarter DAs are insignificant for the stockholders' meetings that triggered the offerings but are significantly for the quarter of subscription payments for the new shares, (2) DAs for the offering firms appear to be significantly negative immediately subsequent to the payments, (3) DAs subsequent to the subscription payment seasons are more pronounced for firms with greater financial leverage or ownership concentration, (4) DAs for the subscription payment seasons are significantly greater (less)for firms disclosing that they aim at debt repayment (capacity expansions) via SEOs, (5) our modified Jones tests, which adopt the decision measure of equity offerings as an endogenous variable, also strongly support the notion of earnings management.