本文係假設存在賦稅制度，兩世代皆利己的前提下，運用Bernoulli效用函數模型建構一個兩世代看護模型，探討長期看護保險應如何做最適規劃，以求效用極大化。結論是(1)當稅後工資率小於稅後長期看護價格：且若子女願意看護時，則父母長期看護保險支出與子女提供看護時數呈同向關係；然若子女不願意看護時，則呈反向關係。(2)當稅後工資率大於稅後長期看護價格：則與前述結論剛好相反。再者，當父母能充分掌握子女行為訊息時，一旦子女增加看護與父母降低保險自負比率的利益總和小於一時，則父母提高保費的成本將大於增加的利益，此時存在一個保險支出EI=0的角解；反之，則呈現曖昧不明的現象。

　　　　　This study assuming that the consumers were self-interested under the given tax system, constructs an intergeneration model by using Bernoulli utility function to explore consumers' purchasing plan of optimal long-term care (LTC) insurance for maximizing their expected utility. We find that (1) if the children are willing to provide care giving and the after income-tax wage rate were less than after-legacy-tax the premium for LTC insurance, then the expenditure of LTC insurance is positively relative to the amount of care giving. If the children aren's willing to provide care giving, others being equal, then the expenditure of LTC insurance is negatively relative to the amount of care giving. (2) If the after-income-tax wage rate were higher than after-legacy-tax the premium for LTC insurance, then the results are just opposite to the findings above. Meanwhile, if parents know well of children's behavior, the benefit from higher expenditure of LTC insurance would be smaller than the cost incurred when the children increase the amount of care giving and the deductible decreases. Then, a corner solution was found. Otherwise, the relationship is ambiguous.