針對以行為對錯為核心議題之責任倫理學(譬如效益主義與義務論)，當代德行論者認為無法實當界定德行於道德判斷中的地位。以效益主義為例，此一理論有可能將德行工具化，使其成為可以被任意犧牲的價值，同時更由於德行工具化結果，使得行為者卓越人格之培養成為空談，無法於行為者之人格特質與行為價值間保持一致性。本文以彌爾效益主義為例，對彌爾如格於其效益主義中為德行尋求定位，以及其觀點為何無法通過德行倫理學陣營之批評進行分析。最後將指出，彌爾效益主義之所以未能滿足當代德行論者的要求，主要原因在於，他由邏輯與心理兩層次界定德行與幸福之間關係的嘗試，並未完全能夠擺脫德行被任意工具化，並進一步導致人格與行為間不一致性的境況。

　　　　　Contemporary ethicians assume that duty ethics, which focuses on right and wrong (like utilitarianism and deontology), cannot adequately delineate the importance of virtues among all moral judgments. For example, utilitarianism can instrumentalize virtues, turning them into values that can be sacrificed at will. Furthermore, the instrumentalization of virtues makes the cultivation of excellent character pointless and the consistence between character and behavior values hardly possible. This paper is intended to explore how Mill seeks to define virtues in terms of his utilitarianism and analyze why his perspective cannot deal with the criticism from the camp of virtue ethics. At last, it will be noted that the reason why Mill's utilitarianism cannot fulfill the contemporary virtue ethicians' requirements lies primarily in: with his attempt to define the relationship between virtues and happiness at the levels of logic and psychology, virtues may still be instrumentalized and, moreover, lead to the incongruity between character and behaviors.