不同於過去討論頻譜配置的文獻，本文從制度論出發，探討制度對頻譜配置的政策效果。由於企業投資有其風險，政府配置頻譜時必須考慮不同的機制及制度配套對企業利潤的影響，否則無法有效地核釋頻譜。本文論證在核釋頻譜時，建立適切的制度配套可降低廠商經營的風險，提高廠商的預期獲利，增加廠商投資電信事業的意願。本文並建立一數理統計模型，以實證研究說明配套制度為頻譜財產權及政府公信力。惟有建立頻譜財產權（包括移轉和永久使用權）和維繫政府施政的公信力（限制主管機關的行政裁量權），企業投資頻譜的風險才會降低，企業也因此願意競標或申請執照。本文實證結果可提供政策制定者核釋頻譜的依據，例如以法律規定頻譜╱執照核發事宜、允許頻譜轉售及取消執照期限。如此的頻譜配置政策方可成功。

　　　　　This paper applies the transaction cost theoretic approach to examine the impacts institutions have on the spectrum allocation policy. Due to the risks incurred to businesses during investment, spectrum allocation cannot be implemented efficiently unless government takes into account the institutional effects. This paper argues that the firms' expected profits from telecommunications investment could increase with the institutions constituted during spectrum allocation that are able to reduce firms' managerial risks. In this sense, they are more willing to bid for wireless licenses. The paper also performs an econometric model to testify the institutional impacts. The empirical results show that the firms' willingness to bid the licenses and the auction prices increase as the spectrum property right is specified and the allocation policy is credibly committed. As a conclusion, the paper suggests that, in order to succeed the allocation policy, (1)the terms and conditions of spectrum allocation must be written into legislation, and (2)the spectrum property right is universal and transferable.