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題名：董監事結構、董監事連結與經營績效關係之研究
作者：梁富梅
作者(外文)：LIANG FU-MEI
校院名稱：國立臺北大學
系所名稱：企業管理學系
指導教授：黃營杉
學位類別：博士
出版日期：2007
主題關鍵詞：董監事結構；代理理論；資源依賴理論；董監事連結；Board Structure；Agency Theory；Resource Dependence Theory；Interlocking Directorates
原始連結：連回原系統網址new window
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公司治理之主要目的是降低代理成本，並透過資源依賴理論，藉由董事跨組織關係或其不同的背景長才，以掌握環境變動所帶來的機會及威脅。由於董事會是公司治理中最重要的一環，國內過去探討董監事與經營績效關係之研究相當多，但多侷限於組織內部的議題，針對董監事連結所引起之跨組織關係的相關研究卻寥寥可數。因此本研究旨在探討董監事結構與公司績效之間關係，並透過董監事連結之中介效果，藉以了解董監事結構對公司績效之直接效果與間接效果。
以往相關文獻在探討董事會與企業經營績效之關係時，研究結果相當紛歧，其主要原因除了未考慮中介變數的影響外，且未將外部董監事詳細區分為外部非獨立董監事及獨立董監事。本研究為驗證近年來證期會推動獨立董監事制度之成效，將董監事結構細分為：董監事規模、外部非獨立董監事與獨立董監事三部份。而董監事連結則依連結對象不同，細分為產業內連結與產業外連結。
本研究以國內94年度電子類上市公司共277家為研究對象，各公司資料取自年報與新報資料庫。先以社會網絡分析軟體UCINET VI進行網絡分析，之後採用層級迴歸分析驗證董監事連結之中介效果，及結構方程模式進行模式評估與假說檢定。研究發現：(1).董監事規模與外部非獨立董監事對經營績效關係皆不顯著，但獨立董監事則與兩項績效指標皆呈顯著正相關。除了因為獨立董監事沒有實際參與公司業務執行，在董事會可扮演重要監督管理的角色外，獨立董監事更可透過產業內董監事連結的中介角色，增加企業的外部資源，進而對經營績效產生間接效果。(2).董事會結構為董監事連結之重要前置因素。而其中外部非獨立董監及獨立董監對產業內連結影響最大，可見外部董事之社會網絡較豐富，進而容易取得外部資源。(3).不同的董監事連結對象，對經營績效產生不同影響。此主要因國內電子產業緊密垂直與水平合作的特殊生態，故產業內連結對績效有顯著的正面影響，而產業外連結對市場指標則不顯著。
The primary objective of corporate governance is to reduce agency cost, and furthermore, take the advantage of environmental opportunities and threats through the interlocks of boards by the Resource Dependence Theory. A company’s board of directors is at the core of corporate governance. Although literature on boards and firm performance is quite rich, little of it is concerned with inter-organizational relationship. Therefore, the study aims to examine the relationship between board structure and firm performance, and by the mediating role of interlocking directorates, to realize the direct effect and indirect effects of board structure and firm performance.
In the past, the empirical results of relevant studies about board structure and firm performance are quite different. The first reason is ignoring the mediating role, and not splitting the outside directors into affiliated directors and independent directors is the second reason. This study intends to understand the effects of the policy about independent directors promoted by Securities & Futures Institute. So there are three variables about board structure: board size, affiliated directors and independent directors. As for the interlocking directorate, there are two variables: intra-industry interlocks and inter-industry interlocks.
This study adopted 2005 data on 277 Taiwanese public electronic firms. The data came from annual reports and TEJ. In order to examine the structure of interlocking directorates in Taiwanese electronic firms, the study used UCINET VI . The hypotheses are tested using multi regression models and structure equation model (Lisrel 8.30). Empirical results are summarized as follow:
(1). The board size and affiliated directors are not related to firm performance, but independent directors are positively related to firm performance. Hence, independent directors can effectively monitor managers. What’s more, by the mediating role of board interlocks, independent directors allow the firm access to productive resources and information.
(2).As predicted, board structure is an important antecedent to board interlocks, especially affiliated and independent directors. Outside directors have rich social network s and resources.
(3). In addition, the results demonstrate that different kinds of interlocks have different impacts to firm performance. Because Taiwanese electronic firms cooperate intensively, intra-industry interlock is significantly and positively related to firm performance, whereas inter-industry interlock is not significantly related to firm performance.
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