The study of Hobbes's Leviathan has long been dominated by a materialistic reading, which deeply ignores the moral and political implications of the masterpiece that its author intended to deliver. The article explores these lacunae, seeking an alternative interpretation for grasping the ideas of cause and reason which seem to have coexisted in Hobbes's writings. It is my view, following Oakeshott, that Leviathan is a "work of art", a "myth", not science, that Hobbes was a ferocious sceptic with a "darkly sceptical doctrine", and consequently that Hobbes never confused the rational conduct based on scientific reasoning with the moral conduct arising from the activity of willing. In order to make the case that Hobbes is better understood as a moral philosopher, establishing a new foundation of obligation in terms of volition, rather than a political scientist, explaining the empirical world according to causality, I will try to re-place Hobbes into the very context of crise Pyrrhonienne. All this, I hope, may help us arrive at a different point to reconsider the "paradoxes of Hobbes", to use Bentham's famous phrase, namely, whether Hobbes is a proto-liberal or an absolutist.