民間參與提供公共服務已成為近十多年來的世界潮流，我國政府對此方面的推動亦不遺餘力，然而在現行「促進民間參與公共建設法」所形成的制度系統中，專案的可行性必須來自於「自償性」，社會輿論甚至因部分個案爭議而形成了促參必須「政府零出資」的氛圍，於是為達成年度推案績效，許多專案以釋出附屬事業開發權為出路，卻又在履約階段被置疑公共服務優先性被附屬事業開發利益取代而違背公益，促參模式之正當性陷入了無力扭轉的惡性循環。本研究運用交易成本理論，推論出上述國內面臨之促參難題，係來自於經濟學上所謂的「治理結構失衡」，並由此進一步主張，國內應積極正視引進英國PFI系統的重要性，才是將民間參與公共服務模式健全化的理性途徑。

In recent decades, private participation in provisions of public services has been growing into a global trend. Against this backdrop, Taiwanese government has made substantial efforts at promoting this procurement system. Nonetheless, owing to overemphasis on self-sufficiency ratio or even unduly regard for the principle of “zero government funding” as of utmost importance in practice, the government procurement authority was often forced to award the private investor the excessive right to develop affiliated facilities in order to make the project financially viable. The private investor who normally put profit maximisation before any other goals would tend to develop the project into a way against the public interest. The pressure of the media often compels the government authority to intervene so as to redress the problems, which then tends to spill into disputes and cause transaction costs. The hard-fought dispute may give rise to adverse knock-on effects on the long-term trading relationship and the image of the system in society. Through a model built on the methodology of transaction cost economics, this research finds that most of the key problems encountered in the execution of private finance projects are originated from the misalignment of governance structures. The government authority should be made aware that, with no PFI system available for choice, the problems looks set to get worse.