􀱜􀐶􀦉􀱛􁏢􀣚􀲞􁄍􀗢􀡕􀝀􁍕􀇴􁀀􀭍􁍕􀚩􁉺􀜄􀦉􀱛􀎟􀞣􀺎􀣁􀒥􀵑􀥎􀱦􀇴􀏕 􀏌􀣬􀧒􀞑􀳕􁌄􁁰􁉺􀱛􁍕􀇶􁃹􀜭􀳭􁅿􁢀􁗺􀇴􀑌􀨥􀶸􀶜􀑀􀎋􀦺􀏩􀝋􀳕􁌄􁁰􁉺􀱛􁍕 􀞑􀐑􀝤􀓣􁔈􀇶􁏵􀔜􀝤􀜌􀙂􀇴􀡕􀝀􁍕􀇴􁀀􀭍􁍕􀚩􁉺􀜄􀦉􀱛􀚁􁃴􀓚􀔾􀬞􁃹􀏌􀓕􀞑 􀭢􁚒􀇴􀦚􀟾􀎢􀑑􀐰􀙠􀕉􀏌􀧺􀇶􀒁􀐎􀔑􀓧􀗥􀺑􀔜􁇥􀇴􀙠􀒗􀔜􀨒􀏷􀳕􁌄􁁰􁉺􀱛􁍕 􀞑􀹈􁄬􀭢􁚒􀇶􀐎􀴕􀥨􀳽􀒽􀓃􁙁􀤾􁇥􀜴􀑌􀨥􀞑􀱛􁍕􀞑􀭷􀒁􀹈􁄬􀇴􀙠􁃋􁁂􀦅􀒅􀾽 􀏍􀞑􁅅􀢰􀇶􀡕􀑊􀳽􀒽􀮒􁍕􁛾􀚁􀱛􁍕􀣁􀕖􀒂􀫈􁛾􀔋􀈨􀎟􁅿􁁰􁉺􀱛􁍕􀑑􀐰􀦋􀧒􀈩 􀔜􁍕􀔑􀇴􀺾􀔶􀵩􀳕􁌄􁁰􁉺􀱛􁍕􀞑􀭔􀏩􀐑􀝤􀶜􀑀􀽀􀙀􀇶

Abstract Contemporary normative theories of ethics are often divided into three categories, namely the consequentialist theories, the deontological theories, and virtue ethics. For many, this trichotomy naturally suggests that the three categories of theories are totally incompatible. Based on his proposal of a new taxonomy of normative ethics, however, Shelly Kagan rejects this very suggestion. His stance is that, in principle, the three ethical theories are completely compatible, only that they address three different concerns in normative ethics. The present paper aims to show that Kagan’s taxonomy cannot justify the compatible thesis, and to provide some remarks on the structure of normative ethical theory. The paper is divided into two parts. Part I offers a critical introduction to Shelly Kagan’s classification scheme and other related issues. Part II proceeds to argue why the compatible thesis which rest on Kagan’s taxonomy cannot be retained. On the basis of these discussions, the paper ends with some suggestions on the problem of classification of normative ethical theory.