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題名：修正式無保留意見是否預告了公司不佳的經營績效？
書刊名：管理與系統
作者：黃旭輝 引用關係／林佳慧／黃一祥 引用關係／張志向 引用關係
作者(外文)：Huang, Hsu-huei／Lin, Chia-hui／Huang, I-hsiang／Chang, Chih-hsiang
出版日期：2011
卷期：18:2
頁次：頁239-266
主題關鍵詞：修正式無保留意見；公司治理；董事會結構；股權結構；Modified unqualified opinion；Corporate governance；Board structure；Ownership structure
原始連結：連回原系統網址new window
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  • 被引用次數被引用次數:期刊(2) 博士論文(0) 專書(0) 專書論文(0)
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  • 共同引用共同引用:19
  • 點閱點閱:99
修正式無保留意見是否預告了公司不佳的經營績效？是一個重要且尚未有人討論過的議題。本文以2000至2003年間收到此一審計意見的535個台灣上市公司作爲研究對象。結果發現收到修正式無保留意見的公司，其未來的經營績效的確低於產業的平均水準。而且，在六種不同的修正式無保留意見原因中，被簽發對繼續經營假設存有疑慮的公司，其後續的經營績效表現最差。此外，我們還進一步發現公司治理較佳的公司，受到此一審計意見負面訊息的影響較低，本文所稱的公司治理機制較佳包括有聘任外部董事的公司、非家族企業、內部人以及法人持股比率較高的公司。
Does modified unqualified opinion foresee a poor performance is a central but never discussed issue. We explore this story using a sample of 535 event companies listed on Taiwan Stock Exchange during 2000-2003. Our results show that firms receiving this auditing report would experience poor performance relative to their industry peers, furthermore, the companies would get a worst performance when this auditing opinion comes from a reason of going-concern. In addition, we find those firms with better corporate governance, including companies with outside directors, higher insider shareholdings, higher institutional shareholdings and non-family-owned business, would suffer less negative impact from this gloomy opinion.
期刊論文
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16.Huson, Mark R.、Parrino, Robert、Starks, Laura T.(2001)。Internal Monitoring Mechanisms and CEO Turnover: A Long-term Perspective。The Journal of Finance，56(6)，2265-2297。  new window
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20.Anderson, Ronald C.、Mansi, Sattar A.、Reeb, David M.(2004)。Board characteristics, accounting report integrity, and the cost of debt。Journal of Accounting and Economics，37(3)，315-342。  new window
21.Mandelker, Gershon N.、Agrawal, Anup(1990)。Large Shareholders and the Monitoring of Managers: The Case of Antitakeover Charter Amendments。Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis，25(2)，143-161。  new window
22.Brickley, James A.、Lease, Ronald C.、Smith, Clifford W. Jr.(1988)。Ownership Structure and Voting on Antitakeover Amendments。Journal of Financial Economics，20，267-291。  new window
23.La Porta, Rafael、Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio、Shleifer, Andrei、Vishny, Robert W.(1999)。The Quality of Government。The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization，15(1)，222-279。  new window
24.Easterbrook, Frank Hoover(1984)。Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends。American Economic Review，74(4)，650-659。  new window
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26.Teoh, Siew Hong、Wong, T. J.(1993)。Perceived Auditor Quality and the Earnings Response Coefficient。The Accounting Review，68(2)，346-366。  new window
27.Fama, Eugene F.(1980)。Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm。Journal of Political Economy，88(2)，288-307。  new window
28.Pound, John(1988)。Proxy contests and the efficiency of shareholder oversight。Journal of Financial Economics，20(1/2)，237-265。  new window
29.Jensen, Michael C.(1986)。Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers。The American Economic Review，76(2)，323-329。  new window
30.Jensen, Michael C.(1993)。The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control systems。The Journal of Finance，48(3)，831-880。  new window
31.Kesner, Idalene F.、Dalton, Dan R.(1986)。Boards of directors and the checks and (Im)balances of corporate governance。Business Horizons，29(5)，17-23。  new window
32.Weisbach, Michael S.(1988)。Outside directors and CEO turnover。Journal of Financial Economics，20(1/2)，431-460。  new window
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34.Jensen, Michael C.、Meckling, William H.(1976)。Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure。Journal of Financial Economics，3(4)，305-360。  new window
35.Beasley, Mark S.(1996)。An Empirical Analysis of the Relation between the Board of Director Composition and Finacial Statement Fraud。The Accounting Review，71(4)，443-465。  new window
36.Davis, R. R.(1982)。An Empirical Evaluation of Auditor's Subject-to Opinions。Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory，2(1)，13-32。  new window
37.Banks, D. W.、Kinney Jr., W. R.(1982)。Loss Contingency Reports and Stock Prices: An Empirical Study。Journal of Accounting Research，20(1)，240-254。  new window
38.Baskin, E. F.(1972)。The Communicative Effectiveness of Consistency Exceptions。The Accounting Review，47(1)，38-51。  new window
39.Baysinger, B.、Hoskisson, R. E.(1990)。The Composition of Boards of Firectors and Strategic Control: Effects on Corporate Strategy。The Academy of Management Review，15(1)，72-87。  new window
40.Loudder, M. L.、Khurana, I. K.、Sawyers, R. B.、Cordeiy, C.(1992)。The Information Content of Audit Qualifications。Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory，11(1)，69-82。  new window
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圖書
1.Berle, Adolf Augustus Jr.、Means, Gardiner C.(1932)。The Modern Corporation and Private Property。Macmillan Publishing Company。  new window
2.Bacon, Jeremy(1973)。Corporate Directorship Practices: Membership and Committees of The Board。The Conference Board。  new window
圖書論文
1.Morck, R. K.、Stangeland, D. A.、Yeung, B.(2000)。Inherited Wealth, Corporate Control, and Economic Growth: The Canadian Disease。Concentrated corporate ownership。Chicago, IL：National Bureau of Economic Research：University of Chicago Press。  new window
 
 
 
 
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