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題名：關係人交易之探討：代理成本或交易成本？
作者：許智順
作者(外文)：Joseph C. S. Hsu
校院名稱：雲林科技大學
系所名稱：管理研究所博士班
指導教授：簡俱揚
學位類別：博士
出版日期：2011
主題關鍵詞：股權結構；經營績效；產業專家；公司治理；關係人交易；Operating performance；Ownership structure；Auditor industry specialization；Corporate governance；Related party transactions
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關係人交易存在利益衝突假說及效率交易假說兩種截然不同的觀點：利益衝突假說係基於Berle and Means（1932）及Jensen and Meckling（1976）的代理成本理論，認為關係人交易隱藏著管理當局不當的利益輸送或資源移轉，產生代理成本，損害投資大眾利益；效率交易假說係基於Coase（1937）及Williamson（1975）的交易成本理論，認為關係人交易可以將市場交易內部化，透過各關係企業的資源流用，降低交易成本，增進公司經營績效。關係人交易究竟係屬利益輸送的管道，或是效率經營的模式，過去文獻尚未獲得一致的結論，本研究認為這兩種截然不同的觀點並非無法同時存在，因此本研究分成三個部份，分別探討關係人交易如果考量公司治理、產業專家或股權結構之後，是否可能抑制或加深負面利益衝突的問題，並且促成正面效率交易的發生，亦即關係人交易與經營績效之關連性，是否存在公司治理、產業專家或股權結構之正向或負向調節效果。
本研究以資產報酬率（ROA）來衡量經營績效，以四大會計師事務所（BIG）及獨立董監（IBS）來衡量公司治理，以銷貨收入淨額（SPEC_S）及查核客戶數（SPEC_C）來衡量產業專家，以現金流量權（C）及投票權與現金流量權的偏離程度（VdC）來衡量股權結構。實證結果發現：首先，關係人交易會對公司經營績效產生負向影響；其次，關係人交易與公司治理或產業專家之交乘作用，會對公司經營績效產生正向調節效果；再者，現金流量權愈大，可使關係人交易轉為有利公司經營績效；最後，投票權與現金流量權的偏離程度愈大，會使關係人交易更加損害公司經營績效。實證結果顯示關係人交易利益衝突假說及效率交易假說的存在，並且支持關係人交易與經營績效之關連性，存在公司治理、產業專家或股權結構之調節效果。本研究對於關係人交易對立的理論觀點及混亂的實證證據具有貢獻。
There are two alternative views of related party transactions: the conflict of interest view, which is consistent with the theory of agency costs considered by Berle and Means (1932) and Jensen and Meckling (1976); the efficient transactions view, which extends the concept of transaction costs developed by Coase (1937) and Williamson (1975). I argue that the conflict of interest and efficient transactions views do not always yield mutually exclusive conclusions. In this study, I attempt to disentangle these two contrasting views. I hypothesize that the association between related party transactions and firm performance is conditional on the moderating effect of corporate governance, auditor industry specialization, or ownership structure.
I adopt ROA to measure operating performance, Big-N CPA firms or independent boards and supervisors to measure corporate governance, the sales-based or number-of-clients-based market shares to measure auditor industry specialization, and the cash flow rights or the divergence between voting rights and cash flow rights to measure ownership structure. The empirical results reveal that there is a negative relationship between related party transactions and firm performance and a positive moderating effect of corporate governance or auditor industry specialization. In addition, there is a positive moderating effect of the cash flow rights and a negative moderating effect of the divergence between voting rights and cash flow rights. This study contributes to the debate about the competing theoretical perspective and the mixed empirical evidence of related party transactions.
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