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題名:相對績效資訊對投資計畫風險的經濟效果與行為效果:展望理論之運用
書刊名:商管科技季刊
作者:邱炳乾 引用關係
作者(外文):Chiou, Bing-chyan
出版日期:2011
卷期:12:4
頁次:頁451-478
主題關鍵詞:相對績效資訊展望理論辯證責任Relative performance informationProspect theoryAccountability
原始連結:連回原系統網址new window
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  • 被引用次數被引用次數:期刊(0) 博士論文(0) 專書(0) 專書論文(0)
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  • 共同引用共同引用:21
  • 點閱點閱:21
過去研究顯示相對績效資訊對工作績效具有經濟效果與行為效果。然而,相對績效資訊對投資計畫風險行為之經濟效果與行為效果的相關研究卻付之闕如。本研究以實驗設計法,透過共變數分析與Wilcoxon無母數統計檢定發現,相對績效獎酬下的投資計畫風險顯著高於絕對績效獎酬,此一結果在共同不確定程度越高時越顯著。另一方面,在相對績效獎酬下,相對績效資訊的框架效果顯著,因此顯示相對績效資訊對投資計畫風險具有經濟效果,但是在絕對績效獎酬下給予相對績效資訊對投資計畫風險並無影響,顯示相對績效資訊對投資計畫風險的行為效果不顯著。此外,本研究發現辯證責任(accountability)可以有效的減緩相對績效資訊的框架效果。
The previous research had showed the economic and behavioral effect of relative per-formance information (RPI) on job performance. This study collects data through experiment design and analyzes data through analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) and Wilcoxon non-parameter test to examine the economic and behavioral effect of RPI on the risk of in-vestment projects. The results support the inference that the project risk of relative perform-ance evaluation (RPE) is higher than absolute performance evaluation (APE) and difference of project risk between RPE and APE increases along with high common uncertainty. In addi-tion, the framing effect of relative performance information is significant on the condition of RPE rather than APE. This means that the economic effect of RPI on the project risk is re-markable but the behavioral effect is not. Furthermore, this study corroborates that the ac-countability mitigates the framing effect of RPI on the condition of RPE.
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學位論文
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